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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a peculiar thread that links vast and incongruent cases:
the man who restricted his own freedom to trade, a fellow who bet on
Napoleon’s life,1 a parent who fettered his estate for perpetuity, a
married man who proposed to another woman while he was still in the
process of divorce,2 a company that appointed an employee as trustee
in an insolvency proceeding to make the company a creditor of itself,3
and an arbitral award delivered in favor of a country with strained
political relation with the country of the court’s proceedings.4  In most
instances mentioned here, contracts or awards were found to be unen-
forceable.  Yet, these cases—and many more similar ones—hardly
shed any light on this peculiar thread called public policy.  It is only
through redefining and revisiting the concept of public policy that we
can finally begin to make sense of this historically convoluted and
often-neglected doctrine.
In a liberal democracy it is well settled now that public order is as
important as individual freedom.  Creating a public sphere and acces-
sing it by citizens require certain limitations on the liberty of the citi-
zens.  In the language of John Rawls, “[M]aintenance of public order is
understood as a necessary condition for everyone’s achieving his
ends . . . .”5  Liberal democracy is a public dialogue6 with precondi-
tions that limit the scope of the very same public dialogue.7  For better
or worse, and because of a lack of any viable alternatives, it is through
the government apparatus that those limits are placed in society.  The
limits appear and are justified in various forms: public order, public
security, public health, public interest, public policy, and so forth.  All
these forms are designed to save, maintain, and potentially expand
the public sphere for citizens.8
1. Gilbert v. Sykes (1812) 16 East 150 (Eng.).
2. Fender v. Mildmay [1938] A.C. 1 (Eng.).
3. Farmer’s Mart v. Milne [1915] A.C. 106 (Eng.).
4. Nat’l Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1990).
5. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 187 (6th ed. 1999).
6. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 (1980) (“The liberal
state is not a private club; it is rather a public dialogue by which each person can
gain social recognition of his standing as a free and rational being.”).
7. Id. at 298 (“[T]he effort by all citizens to ground their power relations upon a
political culture that all may recognize as falling within the conversational limits
defined by Neutrality.”).
8. In a liberal democracy, the logic of the public sphere is highly procedural and
formalistic.  Eva Illouz, Reinventing the Liberal Self: Talk Shows as Moral Dis-
course, in THE POLITICS OF SELFHOOD: BODIES AND IDENTITIES IN GLOBAL CAPITAL-
ISM 137 (Richard-Harvey Brown ed., 2003).
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Yet, what remains unclear is the extent to which the limits man-
dated by the public sphere9 constrain the private legal acts of citizens.
In other words, it remains unsettled which aspects of our public life—
for instance certain economic policies related to antitrust—render
contrary private legal acts such as contracts unenforceable, and
through which logic.  It is precisely the cross section of public-affair
mandates and private law that is the focus of this Article and that I
refer to as the doctrine of public policy.
The concept of public policy exists in almost all legal systems.  Yet,
it is one of the most elusive concepts in law given the contradictory
case law and convoluted literature.  It is pleaded on a daily basis in
various courts before various national and international judges.  A
simple search of U.S. case law, for instance, shows that in the last
twelve months, the term “public policy” has been used in more than
7,000 cases.10  Globally, in the area of international arbitration, for
example, a search reveals that more than 160 arbitral awards—at
least those that have been made public11—have referred to the term
“public policy.”12  Similarly, a brief survey of the U.N. Treaty database
indicates that the phrase “public policy” has been inserted in more
than 1,600 international instruments.13  Furthermore, the doctrine of
public policy is a truly trans-substantive doctrine in law.  The specter
of public policy hovers over a multitude of subfields of law—for in-
stance contract law, conflict of laws, arbitration, employment law, and
family law.14
Recently, we have witnessed a resurgence of the discussion sur-
rounding public policy.  This is largely due to its critical impact on the
developing alternative dispute resolution system, both domestically
and in an increasingly globalized world.15  The conceptualization of
9. Historically, the concept of the public sphere developed out of the distinction that
was drawn between opinion and public opinion.  Jurgen Habermas et al., The
Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964), 3 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 49, 50
(1974).
10. Case search of “public policy,” WESTLAW, http://www.next.westlaw.com (follow
“Advance Search” hyperlink; search for phrase “public policy” in “this exact
phrase” search bar; change date to “last 12 months”; search for all cases at federal
and state level).
11. Most commercial arbitration cases do not become public and remain confidential.
12. Arbital award search, KLUWER ARBITRATION, http://www.kluwerarbitration.com
(follow “Advance Search” hyperlink; search for term “public policy” in “free text”
tab; check box “awards” next to “text type” tab).
13. Treaty Database Search, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/ (follow “Ad-
vance Search” hyperlink; follow link “Full-text Search”; type “public policy” in
search bar; change search criteria to “exact”).
14. See infra note 58.
15. See, e.g., Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and International Commercial Arbi-
tration, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 511 (1988); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy:
The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259 (1990); Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor Arbitration Cases, 14 RUTGERS
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public policy determines, to a large extent, the role of arbitrators and
mediators in matters involving public policy concerns.  The extent to
which arbitrators and mediators can assess public policies, as they
come up during proceedings, remains highly unsettled.  Furthermore,
the scope of authority afforded to judges and national courts that re-
view and enforce public policies has proven to be highly discretion-
ary.16  Discussing each topic requires a separate analysis and this
Article will not address these questions in depth.  However, the dis-
cussion put forward in this Article is a critical first step that yields
direct and important implications for the discussion of public policy in
alternative and international dispute resolution among other areas.
The objective of this Article is to open the black box of public policy
and unravel its components.  It aims to re-conceptualize the doctrine
in a way that is more accessible to lawyers and judges.  Public policy is
generally perceived as an elusive concept, which is “but a shifting and
variable notion appealed to only when no other argument is availa-
ble . . . .”17  However, I believe one of the most important reasons that
public policy has become an elusive concept and “the 53rd card in the
L. REV. 217 (1959); S. I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International
Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008);
Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public
Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 173 (1998); Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Pub-
lic Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 91
(2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examina-
tion of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481 (1980); George J. Stigler,
The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1972); David M. Glanstein, A Hail Mary Pass: Public Policy Review of Arbitra-
tion Awards, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297 (2001); James Michael Magee,
The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor Arbitration Awards—
How Far Should Expansion Go?, 39 S.C. L. REV. 465 (1988); Stephen L. Hayford
& Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor Contract and External Law: Revisiting the
Arbitration’s Scope of Authority, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 249 (1993); Carie Fox &
Brian Gruhn, Toward a Principled Public Policy Standard: Judicial Review of
Arbitrators’ Decisions, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 863 (1989); Laurie A. Tribble, Note,
Vacating Arbitrators’ Awards Under the Public Policy Exception: Are Courts Sec-
ond-Guessing Arbitrators’ Decisions?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1051 (1993); Judith Stilz
Ogden, Do Public Policy Gounds Still Exist for Vacating Arbitration Awards?, 20
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 87 (2002); Donald J. Petersen & Harvey R. Boller,
Applying the Public Policy-Exception to Labor Arbitration Awards, 58 DISP.
RESOL. J. 14 (2004); Henry Drummonds, The Public Policy Exception to Arbitra-
tion Award Enforcement: A Path Through the Bramble Bush, 49 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 105 (2012); Paula A. Barran & Todd A. Hanchett, Public Policy Challenges
to Labor Arbitration Awards: Still a Safe Harbor for Silly Fact Finding?, 38 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 233 (2002).
16. A related and equally important discussion is the extent to which courts enforce
foreign public law in cases involving public matters such as criminal, tax, anti-
trust or securities law.  For a comprehensive discussion on this issue, see William
S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161 (2002).
17. Kenneweg v. Allegany Cnty. Comm’rs, 62 A. 249, 251 (Md. Ct. App. 1905).
2016] PUBLIC POLICY IN LAW 689
deck”18 is the lack of serious academic and intellectual engagement
with this doctrine.  Additionally, the exceptional and ambiguous na-
ture of public policy—which might empower judges and arbitrators—
reduces the incentive of the courts and tribunals to lower their poten-
tial authority by clearly delineating the doctrine of public policy.
In this Article, I argue that public policy is not a monolithic concept
but rather consists of three distinct—yet intertwined—notions of pub-
lic.  These three categories are public interest, public morality, and
public security.  The public interest category views the private ar-
rangement of citizens as equal to public arrangements and tries to
strike a balance between the two.  The majority of cases, I posit, fall
into the public interest category, which calls for less court engagement
and a balancing approach.  The public security category aims to pro-
tect citizens from outside threats that might endanger their well-being
and consequently eliminate the public sphere.  The public morality
category, however, attempts to safeguard the ties and mutual identi-
ties between citizens that shape and maintain societal life.  In cases
involving public morality and public security, which are rare and ex-
treme cases, the courts should play a more active role and apply meth-
ods other than balancing.19  The reason for calling these instances
“extreme” rests on the idea that the trumping capacity of public life
over private arrangements is at its highest when involving cases of
public security and morality.
In order to tackle this challenging topic, it is imperative that the
doctrine of public policy be situated in legal history and legal theory.
Part II provides a brief history of the notion of public policy in common
law, as well as its historical paradigm shifts.  It shows how the doc-
trine of public policy evolved from a community-based notion to a mod-
ern statehood tool exerting mandates of public order.  The extent to
which the doctrine of public policy follows the logic of efficiency is the
focus of Parts III and IV.  These two Parts attempt to show the good,
bad, and ugly aspects of the doctrine of public policy in light of the law
and economics approach.  Part III lays out the economic justifications
for the doctrine of public policy in order to discover the best interpre-
tation of this doctrine under the law and economics approach.  Part IV
discusses the shortcomings of the law and economics approach in its
failure to fully grasp all aspects of the doctrine of public policy.  It
shows why courts need to play a more active role in certain cases in-
volving public policy concerns.  It also investigates the reasons that
18. W. Michael Reisman, Law, International Public Policy (So-Called) and Arbitral
Choice in International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
2006: BACK TO BASICS? 849, 854–55 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2008).
19. In all cases involving public policy concerns courts can act sua sponte, yet the
level of court involvement differs depending on the matter before it.
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judicial systems need a multi-level analysis of the doctrine of public
policy.
After the historical (diachronic) as well as a-historical (synchronic)
analysis of the doctrine, Part V dissects the notion of public policy in
order to show the three main components of it.  This Part aims to
crack open the long-closed box of public policy to suggest that there
are in fact three constitutive grammars and logics at play in the doc-
trine of public policy, not one.  Much of the confusion, omission, and
rejection concerning the doctrine of public policy relates to this very
fact.
I should emphasize that the Article focuses on instances where the
public sphere can, and should trump private legal acts.  It is the inter-
section of public order and private legal acts that is the focus of the
Article’s intellectual endeavor.  Sections II.C and II.D aim to clarify
the scope of the Article in more depth.
Furthermore, a terminological clarification is needed at the onset:
the doctrine of public policy is commonly invoked when a legal act is
deemed to violate a rudimentary public interest.  The most common
usage of the term “public policy” in the legal community occurs when a
contract, foreign judgment, arbitral award, or a foreign law is claimed
to violate the public policy of lex fori, meaning the tribunal’s seat.
Courts often declare such contracts or arbitral awards are “contrary to
public policy.”  However, in this Article, the phrase “doctrine of public
policy”20 or “concept of public policy” is preferred for two reasons: (1)
One of the most important instances where courts must struggle to
identify the trumping elements of public life on private legal acts, e.g.,
contracts, is when courts apply the public policy exception.21  Al-
though case-specific, it inevitably stems from an over-arching doctrine
that dictates which aspects of the public sphere have the trumping
capacity over the private acts of citizens; and (2) The public policy ex-
ception cuts through various fields of law at the national and interna-
20. The term “public policy doctrine” has been used in earlier pieces. See, e.g.,
W.S.W. Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q.R. 207 (1922).  The term
has also been defined in the conflict of laws field. See, e.g., Arthur Nassbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L. J. 1027
(1940); Monrad Paulsen & Michael Sovern, Public Policy in Conflict of Laws, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
21. Note the term “contracts against public policy” presents an internal contradic-
tion.  Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in
Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116 n.4 (1988).  Contracts, by defi-
nition, are agreements that carry legal obligations.  Contracts voided on public
policy grounds carry no legal obligations, therefore eviscerating their status as
contracts.  They are merely agreements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty.”); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2007) (defining the term
“contract” as used in the UCC).
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tional level.  Each field cherishes certain basic norms that should not
be encroached upon.  One such example is the unconscionability doc-
trine that aims to protect fairness in bargains as a basic norm.  Inter-
estingly enough, however, each field lumps other unforeseen concerns
into the residual category of the public policy exception.  It is a form of
protecting the public if any critical aspect of the public sphere has
been left unnoticed in legislation or precedents.  This residual cate-
gory merits close scrutiny—not under a rubric of one specific field, but
as it is linked in various fields of law.
In summary, this Article argues that the doctrine of public policy is
a multi-faceted concept with three distinct—yet intertwined—consti-
tutive logics.  The confusion of courts indicates the often-neglected in-
tricacies of the discussion on public policy.  Courts’ opinions have
oscillated between a moralistic account—e.g., analyzing it based on
“basic notions of morality and justice”22—and a rigid positivistic inter-
pretation that subjugates the doctrine only to “laws and precedents.”23
This Article attempts to open this trans-substantive topic and show
the several logics at play in the hope that we witness a more nuanced
and accurate analysis of the doctrine of public policy.
II. PUBLIC POLICY V. PUBLIC POLICY
A. Paradigm Shift
The term “public policy” did not appear until the eighteenth cen-
tury in common law.  Prior to that, there were general references to
“encounter commone ley,” which meant prejudicial to the community
or against the benefits of the commonwealth.  Knight, a legal histo-
22. See, e.g., Parsons & Whitemore Overseas v. Societe Generale De L’industrie Du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974); Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Int’l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1984); Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v.
Gov’t of Belize, 5 F. Supp. 3d 25, 42 (D.D.C. 2013); Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO
Samaraneftegaz, 963 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Telenor Mobile
Commc’n AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 332, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Karen
Maritime Ltd. v. Omar Int’l, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2004);
Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004); Termorio S.A. v. Electranta S.P., 487
F.3d 928, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
23. See, e.g., E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62
(2002) (“[P]ublic policy must be explicit, well defined, and dominant, and must be
ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents and not from general con-
siderations of supposed public interest.”).  Similar language may be found else-
where. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29, 32–33 (1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 767 (1983);
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 68 (1945); David Adam Friedman,
Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563,
612 (2012) (showing that the public policy defense is less likely to succeed if it is
not linked to a statute or regulation).
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rian, considers Dyer’s Case24 to be one of the oldest cases referring to
encounter commone ley.25  This case reflects what I call the traditional
approach to public policy: a notion designed to guard against viola-
tions of communal values and mores.26
One of the first instances where courts employed the term “public
policy” was in the case of Mitchel v. Reynolds.27  In that case, Lord
Macclesfield invalidated a contract that would result in restraint of
trade: “[T]o obtain the sole exercise of any known trade throughout
England, is a complete monopoly, and against the policy of law.”28
The doctrine of public policy first appeared explicitly here in a case
involving the restraint of trade.29  Later, it extended to other areas
such as the rule against perpetuities, sales of offices, marriage con-
tracts, and wagering.
In 1750, Lord Hardwicke offered one of the first definitions of pub-
lic policy that was illuminating: contracts against public policy are of
no effect not because either of the parties has been deceived but be-
cause they are a “general mischief” to the public.30  More importantly,
Lord Hardwicke transformed the concept from being simply against
the community to being against res publica, i.e., public affairs.  In
other words, he politicized the concept of public policy in such a way
that sovereign considerations would receive significant weight in the
courts:
[P]olitical arguments in the fullest sense of the word, as they concern the gov-
ernment of a nation, must, and have always been, of great weight in the con-
sideration of this court, and though there may be no dolus malus, in contracts
as to other persons, yet if the rest of mankind are concerned as well as the
parties, it may properly be said, that it regards the public utility.31
24. Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414).  This case was about a non-compete clause in
which John Dyer promised not to use his art for half a year or else the other party
could forfeit Dyer’s deposit bond.  The court rejected this arrangement. See
KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLU-
TION 33 (2003).
25. Knight, supra note 20, at 207; Robert F. Brachtenbach, Public Policy in Judicial
Decisions, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
26. Winfield believes that the doctrine of public policy’s history traces back to even
before the equity system in common law.  Long before that, judges would consider
the benefit of the public when considering new writs.  Percy H. Winfield, Public
Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 77–79 (1928); Knight,
supra note 20, at 209–10; Kent Murphy, Traditional View of Public Policy and
Ordre Public in Private International Law, 11 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 591 (1981).
27. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.); Brachtenbach, supra note 25, at 5.
28. Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349.
29. Amasa M. Eaton, On Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128,
129–30 (1890).
30. Knight, supra note 20, at 209.
31. Id.
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This could be marked as the start of the modern approach to the
doctrine of public policy.32  Lord Mansfield’s interpretation of the doc-
trine of ex dolo malo non oritur actio laid another important founda-
tion for the modern doctrine of public policy: courts should not lend
their resources to aid a man whose cause of action is based on illegal
or immoral ground.33  As Knight noted, the eighteenth century re-
shaped the doctrine of public policy as something distinct from bare
immorality or illegality.34  The modern approach to public policy en-
tailed political considerations, not merely shared communal values for
its justification and its substance.
The politicization of the doctrine of public policy provoked the re-
sistance and hesitation of nineteenth-century common law.  The para-
digm shift from encounter commune ley to counter res publica incited
two main reactions.  One group was dismissive of the notion and be-
lieved it should lie within the sole authority of the legislative body to
decide the policies related to the public.  For instance, in Richardson
v. Mellish, Justice Burrough famously called public policy “a very un-
ruly horse” and “when you get astride of it, you never know where it
will carry you.”35  This has become the most oft-quoted sentence on
the doctrine of public policy to date.36
32. The shift seems to be in line with the emergence of modern contract law, accord-
ing to some legal historians.  Contract law underwent two major paradigms: up to
the late eighteenth century, contract law was centered on the fairness of the bar-
gain.  Afterwards the focus shifted to the will theory of contract law and less so on
the very fairness of the bargain.  Morton J. Hortwitz, The Historical Foundation
of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 917–19 (1974).
33. Id.; see also THOMAS CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF SIMONY 52 (1784) (discussing The
Bishop of London v. Fytche, in which the House of Lords held that resignation
bonds were illegal under the law of simony); Fletcher v. Lord Sondes [1826] 3
Bing. 501, 590 (U.K.); Rex v. Waddington [1800] 1 East 143 (Eng.) (providing an
account of the historical development of contracts held unenforceable due to ille-
gal terms).
34. Knight, supra note 20, at 210 (“The departure lies in the confusion of the princi-
ple of public policy with bare immorality and illegality . . . .”).
35. Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.
36. This case has been cited in various contexts: in the area of law and economics see,
for example, Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); in the area of criminal law and contract law see, for
example, John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law of
Contract, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972); in the field of conflict of laws see, for
example, Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Recip-
rocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J.
1087 (1956); in the area of alternative dispute resolution see, for example, Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22
MARY’S L.J. 259 (1990); in the area of family law see, for example, Harry G.
Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or
Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1985); in the area of tax law see, for example,
Cathryn V. Deal, Reining in the Unruly Horse: The Public Policy Test for Disal-
lowing Tax Deductions, 9 VT. L. REV. 11 (1984); in the area of international arbi-
tration see, for example, Reisman, supra note 18, at 854–55; Loukas Mistelis,
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There were similar doubts in the famous case of Egerton v. Brown-
low: Lord Alderson found it to be “inexpedient” in the opinion of a sen-
sible man.37  Lord Parke opined that it should be the legislator, not
the parties and the courts, that determines public good and public pol-
icy. Egerton is an important case because for the first time the con-
flicting views of judges on public policy were shaped and articulated
clearly.  One view conceptualized public policy as only a guide for as-
certaining the object and purpose of statutes, whereas the opposite
view saw it as an abstract legal standard independent of time and cir-
cumstances.38  The thrust of the dissents’ argument revolved around
the same concerns as voiced earlier by Justice Burrough: public policy
lies in the discretion of legislature, not the judicature.  In short, with a
multitude of statutes, there was no need for judicially crafted public
policy.39
The second group suggested that the courts concentrate on the
state’s interests in cases involving a public policy exception.  For in-
stance, in Cooke v. Turner, while deciding the enforceability of a will
the Judge declared that a condition could be void on the ground of
public policy if it restrained a party “from doing some act which it is
supposed the State has or may have an interest to be done,” for exam-
ple conducting trades or marrying.40  However, if “the State has no
interest whatsoever apart from the interest of the parties them-
selves”41 the court’s involvement would not be necessary, particularly
under the rubric of public policy.
Lord Watson’s opinion in Nordenfeldt v. Maxim serves as another
example for the second group approach:
A series of decisions based upon grounds of public policy, however eminent the
judges by whom they were delivered, cannot posses the same binding author-
ity as decisions which deal with and formulate principles which are purely
legal.  The course of policy pursued by any country in relation to, and for pro-
moting the interests of, its commerce must, as time advances and as its com-
merce thrives, undergo change and development from various causes which
are altogether independent of the action of its courts.42
A distinction between these two approaches—most notably—lies in
the fact that the former endorses a more passive role in the assess-
ment of the public policy exception, whereas the latter encourages
Keeping the Unruly Horse in Control or Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of
(Foreign) Arbitral Awards, 2 INT’L L. FORUM DU DROIT INT’L 248 (2000).
37. Egerton v. Brownlow [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 437 (H.L.).  The case involved a
contingent interest in an estate in the form of condition subsequent.  The House
of Lords found the arrangement void.  24 RULING CASES 118 (Irving Browne et al.
eds., 1901).
38. Winfield, supra note 26, at 88.
39. Id. at 88–89.
40. Cooke v. Turner (1845) 60 Eng. Rep. 449, 502.
41. Id.
42. Nordenfeldt Guns & Ammunition Co. [1894] A.C. 535, 553 (emphasis added).
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courts to actively assess and enforce the state’s interests in this con-
text.  Still, today similar approaches are traceable in courts’ positions
towards this topic.
B. Unruliness of Public Policy
As discussed in the previous section, some judges started to cast
doubt on the applicability of the doctrine of public policy.  Most nota-
bly, Justice Burrough called it a “very unruly horse.”  Yet, despite the
multitude of references to the unruliness of public policy,43 it is not
clear why the resistance towards the notion of public policy emerged.
In other words, this section investigates the very unruly characteristic
of the doctrine of public policy as it has subsisted until today in our
legal culture.
The unruliness of public policy relates to its exogenous nature vis-
a`-vis the logic of legal reasoning.  Simply put, the constitutive narra-
tive of public policy departs from the structure of legal reasoning.  His-
torically, the discussion of public policy has been enmeshed with
contract law.44  The law of contracts is the bedrock on which many
legal systems have developed throughout history.  In short, a contract
is the result of correspondence involving an offer and an acceptance.45
There are formation defects that may prevent the agreement from
coming into existence, commonly as a result of lack or defect in con-
sent.  For example, there will be no contract if acceptance does not
unconditionally match the essential terms of an offer,46 or if accept-
ance is expressed while one person is intoxicated to an extreme
level.47  In these instances, no contract or agreement is ever formed
between the parties.
43. See supra note 36.
44. Brachtenbach, supra note 25, at 5; Arthur Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Polit-
ical Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1940) (“[T]he con-
tracts use of the public policy concept can be traced back to the fifteenth century
and its conflict use to the eighteenth century.”).
45. Historically and under English common law, the modern conception of the con-
tract came as result of recognition of the notion of assumpsit.  In short, assump-
sit, which emerged in the sixteenth century, allowed the non-breaching party in
an agreement to claim damages from the breaching party in the event of mere
non-performance.  Before, the non-breaching party would be liable only if (s)he
was at fault.  GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 40–43 (2d ed. 2014).
46. See, e.g., Iselin v. United States, 271 U.S. 136, 139 (1926) (“[A] proposal to accept,
or an acceptance upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer,
and puts an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made the original offer
renews it, or assents to the modification suggested.”).
47. See, e.g., Seminara v. Grisman, 44 A.2d 492, 494 (N.J. Ch. 1945) (“A contract
should not be enforced where the mind of the party was so disqualified by exces-
sive and complete intoxication that he was at the time mentally incapable of un-
derstanding the subject of the agreement, its nature, and probable
consequences.”).
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On the other hand, there are instances where a contract, after be-
ing fully formed by the parties, does not yield its usual consequences.
Illegality of a contract is one of the prime instances where the contract
is devoid of legal impact.  Usury is a good example in the history of
contract law.  Following Christianity48 and Greek economic theory, re-
ceiving extra payment for the use of a loan was prohibited.  As a re-
sult, contracts that led to usury were found to be unlawful, and thus
void.49
The public policy exception belongs to the second category.  It does
not bear on the formation of contracts but on their effects.  Histori-
cally, for Medieval lawyers the contract was either illegal or not.  No
other categories such as public policy existed.50  Similarly, during the
sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries in common law, illegality
was a general category encompassing contracts rendered void by stat-
ute, contracts contrary to public policy, contracts to commit crimes,
and other categories.51  It was not until later in history that public
policy became a category independent from illegality.  Parties could
not evade public policy by entering into private contracts.  In other
words, private contracts could not be avenues to circumvent the public
policy of states.  As a result, private legal arrangements became sys-
temically subject to public affairs thanks to the doctrine of public pol-
icy.  At the time, three types of contracts were deemed to be against
public policy: (1) contracts that ousted the jurisdiction of the court, (2)
contracts that tended to prejudice the status of marriage, and (3) con-
tracts that restrainted trade.52
Courts gradually employed the category of public policy as a type
separate from illegality in contract law to render certain contracts un-
enforceable.  If a contract is against public policy it is not void, yet it is
unenforceable.  It is best described in the words of Lord Denning in
Bennett v. Bennett:
They are not “illegal,” in the sense that a contact to do a prohibited or immoral
act is illegal.  They are not “unenforceable,” in the sense that a contract within
the Statute of Frauds is unenforceable for want of writing.  These covenants
lie somewhere in between.  They are invalid and unenforceable.53
48. St. Thomas Aquinas famously argued that usury is double payment because the
person who loans receives extra payment for something that does not have an
independent existence. See 1 ALFRED WILLIAM BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 510 (1987).
49. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Warner [1622] 81 Eng. Rep. 1087.  This case is cited in
SIMPSON, supra note 48; see generally MARK ORD, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF USURY
(1809).
50. SIMPSON, supra note 48, at 129.
51. Id. at 508.
52. M.P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE FIFOOT & FURMSTON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 470 (15th ed.
2007).
53. Bennett v. Bennett [1952] 1 KB 249, 260 (Eng.), reprinted in MICHAEL FURMSTON,
CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND FURMSTON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 460 (16th ed. 2012).
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This excerpt attests to the exceptional nature of public policy in
contract law.  The concept of public policy is not only exceptional but
more importantly it is exogenous.  It is imposed by an external neces-
sity or force and has not been duly integrated into the fabric of con-
tract law jurisprudence.  It is “somewhere in between,” as Denning
opines, because it does not entirely fit within traditional illegality doc-
trine as existed in contract law.
Contract law is primarily a matter of private law in which parties
are deemed to be of equal footing.  Neither party has a privilege be-
cause of its social or political status.  Yet, the modern doctrine of pub-
lic policy rests on the idea that enforcing a contract is a matter of
public law.  Delivering justice is a public affair and is done at the pub-
lic expense and, therefore, should be monitored.  Public resources
should not be employed for the execution of an agreement that is inju-
rious to public morality or interest.54  The words of Chief Justice Wil-
mot demonstrate this approach: “It is the duty of all courts of justice to
keep their eye steadily upon the interests of the public, even in the
administration of commutative justice; and when they find an action
is founded upon a claim injurious to public.”55
Henceforth, contract law had to confront an entity that was beyond
the logic resulting from the offer-acceptance paradigm.  Even if all
four corners of the documents complied with provisions of jurispru-
dence of contract law, an external moral or legislative concern could
render it unenforceable.  The very exogenous feature of the public pol-
icy doctrine differentiates it from other similar doctrines such as un-
conscionability.  An unconscionable term goes to the heart of the
balance of considerations in a bargain; public policy doctrine does not
concern itself with the logics of contract law, such as consideration.
This is what’s unruly about public policy.  It has a logic of its own,
separate from the internal logic of private legal acts of citizens.56
More importantly, it could prevent a lawful act from yielding results.
54. ELISHA GREENHOOD, THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
REDUCED TO RULES 2 (1886) (“The strength of every contract lies in the power of
the promise to appeal to the courts to appeal to the courts of public justice for
redress for its violation.  The administration of justice is maintained at the public
expense: the courts will never, therefore, recognize any transaction which, in its
object, operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare.”).
55. C.J Wilmot’s Opinions (Low v. Peers), 377; see also Crawford & Murray v. Wick,
18 Ohio St. 190, 204 (1868) (quoting Chief Justice Wilmot); Gleason v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. Co., 43 N.W. 517, 518 (Iowa 1889) (same).
56. James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOK.
L. REV. 323, 323 (1970) (“To base a decision on the ground of public policy, how-
ever, introduces into the judicial process an element with different characteristics
than the other grounds. It brings into the case an element extrinsic from the
conduct of the parties—the exercise of community control quite apart form stat-
ute, judicial precedent or doctrine.”).
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Public policy is also distinct from illegality.  It is external, exceptional,
and rather haphazard.  Scholars find it almost impossible to pin down
an overarching theory regarding this doctrine.  All these factors ex-
plain the general tendency to contain the public policy doctrine.  Addi-
tionally, in a globalized world in need of predictability, the public
policy doctrine has remained the most unpredictable aspect of global
judicialization.
C. Definition
We hear the phrase “public policy” on a daily basis from media out-
lets to scholarly debates in law and other fields.  Yet, the doctrine of
public policy in law has a distinct and nuanced framework that needs
to be delineated before we embark on analyzing it.  This section pro-
vides an overview on various applications and definitions of the
phrase “public policy”.
The phrase “public policy” is discussed in four contexts: (1) public
policy in a modern sense, i.e., policies pursued and enacted by govern-
ments (especially the administrative aspects);57 (2) public policy as a
mandatory rule that trumps the parties’ contractual agreement; (3)
public policy as it appears in conflict of laws, limiting the application
of foreign rules;58 and (4) public policy that bars the enforcement of
foreign judgments or arbitral awards.
57. Here are some leading definitions in this category: “The term public policy always
refers to the actions of government and the intentions that determine those ac-
tions.” CLARKE E. COCHRAN ET AL., AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION
(1999); “Whatever governments choose to do or not to do.” THOMAS R. DYE, UN-
DERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY (1992); “Stated most simply, public policy is the sum
of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents, as it has an
influence on the life of citizens.” B. GUY PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: PROM-
ISE AND PERFORMANCE (1999); see, e.g., Richard H.W. Maloy, Public Policy—Who
Should Make It in America’s Oligarchy?, 1998 DET. C. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1998).
Often, the term “public policy” does not refer to specific laws and regulations but
a practice by the government that has not been incorporated into law.  PCA
Snyman, Public Policy in Anglo-American Law, 19 COMP. & INT. L. J. OF S. AFR.
220, 221 (1986) (citing Nashville C & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S 362 (1940));
Nussbaum, supra note 44, at 1027 (“[P]ublic policy is relied upon in order to solve
doubts as to the interpretation of legal rules.”).
58. See, e.g., Herbert F. Goodrich, Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 36 W. VA. L.
Q. 156 (1930); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Nussbaum, supra note 44; Charles B. Nutting,
Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REV. 196 (1935);
John Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has the Same
Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 647 (1985); Conrad G. Paulsen & Michael I.
Sovren, “Public Policy” in Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956); Her-
bert W. Greenber, Extrastate Enforcement of Tax Claims and Administrative Tax
Determinations Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 43 BROOK. L. REV. 630
(1977); Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Government
Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932); Willis L. M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1952).  For more
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Public policy, in its first sense, encompasses general public policies
pursued by the government.  Governments try to achieve certain pub-
lic goals, such as promotion of education, prohibition of drug usage,
increased economic efficiency, protection of basic rights, and many
other policies.  Which public policies best suit each government is a
science and a field of study.  Almost all well-reputed universities offer
a degree or a non-degree program in public policy.
Courts often utilize the aforementioned meaning of public policy.
For example, a quick survey of U.S. Supreme Court decisions demon-
strates that this usage of the phrase has been quite common.  For ex-
ample, in Marbury v. Madison the Court found that reasons of public
policy were an underlying ground for the writ of mandamus.59  In U.S.
v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Court confirmed “the strong public policy
of preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”60  In Owen v. City
of Independence and Malley v. Briggs, the Court favored qualified im-
munity because of, inter alia, considerations of public policy.61  An-
recent discussions see, for example, Thomas G. Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de
Police: A Functional Trend in Continental Private International Law—A Compar-
ative Analysis with Modern American Theories, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 661 (1991);
Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice of
Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (1996); Todd C. Hilbig, Will
New York Recognize Same-Sex Marriage?: An Analysis of the Conflict-of-Laws’
Public Policy Exception, 12 U. J. PUB. L. 333 (1998); Lynn L. Hogue, State Com-
mon-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine in Same-Sex Marriage: How Will States Enforce
the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (1998); Murphy, supra
note 26.
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 169–70 (1803) (“Lord Mansfield, in 3d Burrows
1266, in the case of the King v. Baker, et al. states with much precision and ex-
plicitness the cases in which this writ may be used.  ‘Whenever,’ says that very
able judge, ‘there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a
franchise (more especially if it be in a matter of public concern, or attended with
profit) and a person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and
has no other specific legal remedy, this court ought to assist by mandamus, upon
reasons of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of public policy, to
preserve peace, order and good government.’  In the same case he says, ‘this writ
ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific
remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one.’”).
60. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 690 (1958) (“I fully sub-
scribe to the view that the strong public policy of preserving the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings should prevent the general disclosure of a grand jury transcript
except in the rarest cases.”).
61. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 667 (1980) (“Important public poli-
cies support the extension of qualified immunity to local governments.”); see also
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 335 (1986) (“Neither the common law nor public
policy affords any support for absolute immunity.  Such immunity cannot be per-
mitted on the basis that petitioner’s function in seeking the arrest warrants was
similar to that of a complaining witness, since complaining witnesses were not
absolutely immune at common law.  As a matter of public policy, qualified immu-
nity provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 409 (1976) (“The
same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule of abso-
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other example is the Mitsubishi case in which the Court declared the
law endorsed the public policy in favor of competition.62
Public policy, as used in other contexts, refers to an aspect of public
life, emanating from various sources including public policy in the
above-mentioned sense that holds a trump card against contracts,
judgments, and foreign rules.  It seems impossible to define “public
policy” considering its multi-dimensional character.  Lord Truro put
forward a classical definition of “public policy” in 1853 that has been
repeatedly reiterated by subsequent courts.  Lord Truro, in the
landmark case Egerton v. Brownlow, states that public policy is “that
principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good,
which may be termed . . . the policy of law or public policy in relation
to the administration of the law.”63  In the literature, Winfield pro-
vided a basic definition for the concept of public policy: “[A] principle
of judicial legislation or interpretation founded on the current needs of
the community.”64
Yet, only certain types of public policies—in the first sense—could
exert an impact on the enforceability and legality of private contracts
as well as foreign judgments and awards.  The vexing question is how
to draw the line between the two and how to frame the public policy
exception both descriptively and normatively.  Descriptively, it has be-
come almost impossible to find a pattern that courts have followed
when finding contracts against public policy.  From the normative
standpoint, it remains a challenging task to find an all-encompassing
theory that courts should follow in cases involving the public policy
defense.
“Public policy” in this Article refers to situations where private le-
gal acts, e.g., contracts, become unenforceable due to their conflicts
with a public policy deduced from legislation or judge-made rules.  Ra-
tionales put forward for the functionality of this theory are manifold.
In the area of contract law, historically, courts have leaned towards
three main justifications, at least when contracts are against criminal
law.  For contracts in violation of a criminal code, the justification was
that public policy punishes the wrong behavior by refusing to enforce
lute immunity of a prosecutor from a suit for malicious prosecution likewise dic-
tate absolute immunity under [section] 1983.”).
62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 653 n.21
(1985) (“The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less
morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to fur-
ther the overriding public policy in favor of competition.”).
63. Egerton v. Brownlow [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 437 (H.L.).  Earlier, Chief Justice
Tindal provided a similar definition in Hornor v. Graves: “Whatever is injurious
to the interests of the public is void, on the grounds of public policy.”  [1831] 131
Eng. Rep. 284, 287.
64. Winfield, supra note 26, at 92.
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the agreement.65  Moreover, it proscribes lending help to those who
have violated an important public interest.66  Thirdly—more relevant
to legal acts contrary to a criminal prohibition—is the deterrent effect
of the doctrine of public policy.67
One final note is necessary regarding the contours of the public
policy doctrine as it appears in this Article.  This piece does not ad-
dress the situations where the law explicitly declares the contrary
agreements to be unenforceable.  This refers to instances where a stat-
ute declares unequivocally that contrary agreements are void and en-
forceable.68  These are easy cases, requiring no significant discussion
and analysis.  In fact, these cases do not even belong in the discussion
of public policy and invoking the doctrine in these instances seems to
be an erroneous practice.
D. Taxonomy
This section looks at taxonomy and classifications suggested in the
literature for the public policy exception.  Despite the issue’s impor-
tance, the existing literature has not addressed the matter thor-
oughly.  Except for a few notable recent pieces, the majority of the
scholarship dates back to pre-1950.  In 1935, Walter Gellhorn wrote a
classic piece, published in the Columbia Law Review, in which he fa-
vored what could be called the legislation-based doctrine of public pol-
icy.69  Criticizing the judicial-based approach to public policy, he
argues that the role of courts is to discover public policies underlying
65. Shand, supra note 36, at 148.
66. Id. at 151.
67. Id. at 154.  In McMullen v. Hoffman, the Supreme Court of the United States
referred to it as a rationale underlying doctrine of public policy:
[T]o refuse to grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the
enforcement of his alleged rights under it tends strongly towards reduc-
ing the number of such transactions to minimum.  The more plainly par-
ties understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they
place themselves outside the protection of the law . . . .
174 U.S. 639, 669–70 (1899).  In situations where contracts impose costs on third
parties, legislatures and courts face a dilemma:  whether they should hold the
parties subject to criminal or civil liability while leaving the contract intact.  The
other option is to declare the contract unenforceable.  For example, in Mincks
Agri Center, Inc., v. Bell Farms, Inc., the court had to decide whether imposing
criminal penalties for lack of license would be enough for the deterrence effect.
The court decided that the contract concluded during the time the plaintiff did
not have a property license was unenforceable.  611 N.W.2d 270, 270 (Iowa 2000).
In contrast, in Hirman Ricker & Sons v. Students International Mediation Society
the court did not declare the contract unenforceable, even though the plaintiff did
not have a sanitation license.  The court found the additional penalty of non-en-
forceability was harsh and unsound.  342 A.2d 262, 267 (Me. 1975).
68. See infra note 93.
69. Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 679–80
(1935).
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statutes rather than foisting new policies.  What falls under public
policy “is for the legislature to determine” according to Gellhorn,
whereas the judicial body is limited to investigating the content of
public policy.70  He finds penal code provisions to be one effective way
of ascertaining legal acts that are detrimental to public interest.  Even
absent clear-cut legislative intent, contracts assisting or resulting in
certain prohibited criminal acts should be declared unenforceable as
contrary to public policy.71  The last argument was a response to those
who viewed unenforceability of contracts as an additional sanction to
a prohibited act, not stipulated by the legislature.72
Gellhorn’s piece marks the start of the American approach to the
doctrine of public policy.  It essentially seeded skepticism towards the
judicially based public policy doctrine.  Paradoxically, in a common
law system encouraging judicial review, the determination of public
policy was viewed primarily as a task of statutory interpretation.  The
judge’s task was reduced to eliciting non-legal policy deductions from
essentially non-legal materials.73  This approach was probably the
reason behind the general popularity of Richardson v. Mellish among
courts and its oft-quoted description of public policy as an “unruly
horse.”74  This view yields to a transcendental view of public policy, a
hidden wisdom that judges should extract from legislation.75  In sharp
contrast, during the same period Holmes was laying the foundation of
70. Id. at 685.
71. Id. at 683–84.
72. Id. at 683.
73. I MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 187 (1951).
74. See supra note 36.  Justice Burrough differed from Chief Justice Abbott who took
an opposite view in an earlier case, Card v. Hope, on the issue of public policy.
Winfield, supra note 26, at 87; Richardson v. Mellish [1824] 2 Bing. 229, 251.
Interestingly enough, his views have been rarely invoked in the discourse on pub-
lic policy doctrine.  Winfield, supra note 26, at 87.
75. The suggested passive role of judges regarding public policy has a notable conse-
quence for alternative dispute resolution.  For the purpose of this section, it is
worth noting Gellhorn’s theory attracted a group of scholars and practitioners in
international arbitration.  With a reduced role for judges in this area, it remains
less of a challenge to prove that arbitrators not only have the authority to adjudi-
cate public policy-related matters, but also that courts would have limited judi-
cial review discretion. JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 134–35 (2013).
Arbitrators are as competent as judges to discover the intent of the legislative
body as to the underlying public policy of a certain act or regulation.  I will dis-
cuss the merits of this argument in a separate Article.  Yet, one point is worth
considering now: this approach seems to dodge the very vexing question of discov-
ering the nature of public in public policy.  The role of arbitrators is inextricably
linked to the conceptualization of public policy.  The public nature of these poli-
cies needs to be dissected and investigated.  The exiting literature on alternative
dispute resolution shuns away from probing into the tricky nature of what’s pub-
lic.  As I lay out in this Article, public policy is not simply a constructed policy
behind legislation, but rather consists of at least three distinct notions.
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American jurisprudence relying heavily on the role of judges in policy
making.76  This idea has remained an important component of Ameri-
can jurisprudence since then.  For instance, McDougal and Lasswell
find it inevitable—and even desirable—that lawyers engage in shap-
ing policies.77  In spite of this theoretic and practical turn, the public
policy doctrine remained an outlier in the discourse of American legal
realism.  The skeptical view of the unruliness of public policy, whether
articulated by the legislature or the courts, has become the prevailing
narrative.
All scholars, however, do not share this view.  While Gellhorn’s
theory summed up—and by one account initiated—a long-lasting tra-
dition in regards to the concept of public policy, opposing theories
challenged this reductionist view.  Roscoe Pound’s theory probably
furnishes the most important counter-argument to Gellorn’s ap-
proach.  Pound’s theory rests on the social implications of law and not
on any abstract notions, such as natural rights or positivism.  His gen-
eral theoretical interest lies in the ways through which law controls
the social sphere.  In furtherance of his theory, in his seminal piece in
the Harvard Law Review, A Survey of Social Interests, he grapples
with the doctrine of public policy in common law.78  Pound points out
that public policy focused on the individual’s natural rights from the
seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth century.  Social in-
terests, according to Pound, were marginalized due to the prevailing
public policy approach or were construed in the shadow of the abstract
individual right paradigm.79  Consequently, the notion of public policy
routinely conjured up the image of an “unruly horse” and “you never
[knew] where it [would] carry you.”80  Courts became too apprehen-
sive to apply or too hostile to seriously engage the notion of public
policy.  They only paid lip service to it, as Pound mentions:
In truth, the nineteenth-century attitude toward public policy was itself only
the expression of a public policy.  It resulted from a weighing of the social
interest in the general security against other social interests which men had
sought to secure through an overwide magisterial discretion in the stage of
equity and natural law.81
76. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 231 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I recog-
nize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law
judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical non-
sense and shall not enforce it in any court.”).
77. JUSTIN ZAREMBY, LEGAL REALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 99 (2014).
78. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interest, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943).
79. Id. at 5.
80. Richardson v. Mellish [1824] 2 Bing. 229, 251.
81. Pound, supra note 78, at 6.
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As a result, courts forged a few judicial public policies82 in light of
the enlightenment teachings83 and the rest of what constitutes public
policy was left for the legislature to decide.  According to Pound, courts
retained their status as a guardian of “general security exclusively in
terms of individual rights” and did not find it cumbersome to weigh
“social interest in terms of the general security” in the sense de-
scribed.84  Yet, the courts voiced their skepticism about their role in
the advancement of other social interests finding those interests to be
too vague and ill-defined.85  Furthermore, courts noted that they were
restricted to adjudicate the merits of cases before them—a matter
they found limiting to further or establish public policies.
Pound’s piece shed light on the shortcomings of the doctrine of pub-
lic policy in common law and specifically in American jurisprudence.
Juxtaposing it with Gellhorn’s theory, one could understand the con-
ceptual framework on which public policy in American jurisprudence
is premised.  In this framework courts are tasked with protecting
mainly individual rights under the doctrine of public policy, whereas
for other public interests the legislature sets the policies and the
court’s task is to investigate them.  Pound’s piece aims to demonstrate
that the reductionist view leads to undermining other forms of social
interests.  For him, social interests are manifold.  General security is
of paramount importance, which consists of general safety, general
health, and the security of transactions.86  He enumerates the secur-
ity of social institutions such as marriage and religious institutions as
82. Pound enumerates the most prominent judicial public policies created by courts
over the nineteenth century:
First and most numerous are policies with reference to the security of
social institutions.  As to political institutions, there is a recognized pol-
icy against acts promotive of crime or violation of law—in other words, a
policy of upholding legal institution—and a policy against acts prejudi-
cially affecting the public service performed by public officers.  As to do-
mestic institutions, there is the well-known policy against acts affecting
the security of the domestic relations, or in restraint of marriage.  As to
economic institutions, there is the policy against acts destructive of com-
petition, the policy against acts affecting commercial freedom, and the
policy against permanent or general restrictions on the free use and
transfer of property.  Secondly, there are policies with reference to main-
taining the general morals.  Thus there is a recognized policy against
acts promotive of dishonesty.  Also there is a recognized policy against
acts offending the general morals.  Thirdly, there are policies with refer-
ence to the individual social life: a policy against things tending to op-
pression, and a policy against general or extensive restrictions upon
individual freedom of action.
Id. at 7–8 (footnotes omitted).
83. Hegel’s idea of liberty influenced nineteenth-century jurisprudence, and as a re-
sult the notion of public policy. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 17–20.
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the second important social interest.87  Third is the social interest in
the general morals, so called boni mores in Roman law.88  Fourth, he
identifies the conservation of social resources as a public interest,
which should be preserved against individual desires.89  Public inter-
est in general progress constitutes the fifth category of social interest
according to Pound.90  Lastly, and most importantly for Pound, is the
very value of individual life such that every human should be able to
enjoy rights such as individual self-assertion, individual opportunity,
and individual conditions of life.91
Pound was the first scholar to provide a taxonomy of public policy
under the rubric of social interests.  He aimed to broaden the perspec-
tive of what constitute public interests and to change the discourse on
legal order “as one of adjusting the exercise of free wills to one of satis-
fying wants, of which fee exercise of will is but one.”92  He was proba-
bly the first who viewed public policies as graded and not as a
monolithic or an untouchable notion.
There have also been several attempts to formulate public policy
by it sources.  This classification is premised on the clarity of legisla-
tive intent.  The first category belongs to public policies declared ex-
plicitly by the legislature.  Often statutes proclaim unequivocally their
objectives in the preamble of the document or in the text.93  For in-
stance, the Public Housing Law of New York State devotes a section to
describing in detail the policy and purpose of the law.94  The judge’s
task in these instances is minimal since the public purpose of the stat-
ute has been declared by the legislature.  In most cases, judges have to
extrapolate the intent of the legislature to determine the policy under-
lying the statute.  Judges investigate the legislative history and the
context in which the legislation was passed to identify the policy be-
hind it.95  Lastly, in the absence of a legislative or constitutional dec-
laration or a reasonable inference thereupon, courts are permitted to
venture into the area of declaring public policy.96  Antitrust law is a
good example where, due to the vagueness of the Sherman Act, judges
87. Id. at 20–23.
88. Id. at 25.  He opines that in cases involving moral issues “we much reach a bal-
ance between social interest in the general morals, and the social interest in gen-
eral progress, taking form in a policy of free discussion.” Id. at 26.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 33.
92. Id. at 1.
93. Hopkins, supra note 56, at 325–26.
94. N.Y. Pub. Hous. Law § 2, (McKinney 1961) (Policy of State and Purpose of
Chapter).
95. Hopkins, supra note 56, at 326; Brachtenbach, supra note 25, at 18.
96. Hopkins, supra note 56, at 330.
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gradually crafted a body of public policies to protect the society from
unfair competition.97
A taxonomy based on the sources of public policy, as described
above, oversimplifies the complicated problem of public policy.  Not
only does it not provide any substantive guide as to the nature of pub-
lic policy, but its classification might also be easily deconstructed.  For
instance, the preamble of the Patriot Act clearly lays out the purpose
of the statutes “to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States
and around the world.”98  Even if the policy here is clearly declared it
does not render any help to judges.  Judges confront a multitude of
statutes with conflicting public policies, making it almost impossible
to use a statute’s declared policy as a guideline.  In the example above,
the Patriot Act’s public policy turned out to be in conflict with other
documents, including the Constitution.99  The conflicting policies and
vague language of statutes leaves almost all categories open to a judi-
cially based public policy.  In addition, statutory interpretations by va-
rious courts would routinely result in conflicting outcomes.  Therefore,
we can hardly accept that public policy is a matter exclusively for the
legislature to decide.  Judicial public policy and legislative policies
serve inherently distinct functions; the former resolves disputes at
micro level, whereas the latter aims to set broader policies.100
A few scholars have proposed several substantive classifications of
public policy, mainly in the field of contract law.  Furmston divides the
doctrine of public policy into five categories.  First, he pays attention
to instances where contracts are not illegal but rather unenforceable
due to public policy concerns.  The example he provides is Beresford v.
Royal Insurance Co. Ltd.,101 in which the court exonerated an insur-
ance company from executing the insurance contract because the ben-
eficiary had committed suicide.  The decision was based on public
policy and not the contract, which would have supported the view of
the beneficiary’s family.  The House of Lords barred the contract to
yield its results—yet not on the grounds of illegality but rather based
on public policy concerns.102
The second category pertains to instances where contracts lead to
prohibited acts, notably crimes.  These are easy cases where, for exam-
97. See generally HYLTON, supra note 24.
98. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-58, 115 Stat. 272.
99. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom”
for Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the
Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081 (2001).
100. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Com-
mon Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 889 (1991).
101. [1938] A.C. 586, affirming [1937] 2 K.B. 197 (Eng.).
102. M. P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L. J. 267, 268
(1965).
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ple, contracts prescribe committing a crime.103  The third category is
the opposite of the second one.  In instances where the policy of law is
to promote a particular act, no legal acts, including contracts, can re-
strain or prohibit it.  The paramount examples are contracts that re-
strain marriage or trade.104  The next category involves situations
where a contract does not lead to an illegal act, but rather promotes a
tendency that is contrary to the policy of the law.  An example is
where a couple signs a separation agreement for their potential future
divorce.  This very contract might induce divorce, a matter that is con-
trary to the marriage law policy.105
Lastly, a contract might violate public policy if the intention of one
party (or both) is to use it as preparation for an unlawful act.  For
instance, if a person rents a place with the intention of using it for
prostitution, the lease is lawful yet the intention makes the contract
contrary to public policy.106  This study is illuminating as to the vari-
ous ways that public policy could affect legal acts.  Yet, it is a descrip-
tive study and does not provide a theoretical ground on which a
general public policy could be premised.
In another recent case, Friedman endeavors to bring order to the
complicated public policy matters by analyzing data collected from
court decisions.  He finds that in practice, public policy defenses rooted
in a statute or regulation had a 59% success rate, whereas general
appeals to public policy resulted in only a 31% success rate.107  Among
the first category, those cases involving an agreement in direct contra-
vention of licensure or a code had the higher success rate (75%).  The
rest belongs to criminal agreements (57%), agreements that limit or
shift liability (58%) and others (50%).108  This study confirms the spe-
cial status of the legislative branch in setting the public polices and
the heavy weight courts place on policies declared by it.  In spite of
illuminating empirical data, this piece leaves the pressing questions
about the nature of public policy unanswered.
As noted, the current literature does not engage itself with rigor-
ous and substantive analysis of the doctrine of public policy.  Still,
most of the important pieces on this matter date back to opinions in
eighteenth- and ninetheenth-century England and pre-1950 works.
New changes in conflict of laws, contract law, and more importantly
alternative dispute resolution necessitate serious scholarship on this
103. Id. at 280.  For instance, in Evert v. Williams an individual sued for a financial
dispute arising out of a partnership formed to commit a robbery.  [1983] 9 L.Q.R.
197 (Eng.).
104. Furmston, supra note 102, at 292.
105. Id. at 297–98.
106. Id. at 306.
107. David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 581 (2011).
108. Id. at 583.
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front.  Integration of the world economy, globalization, and increasing
cross-border disputes are among the many factors that render public
policy a pivotal doctrine and a pressing issue.  It could serve as a
guardian for national values and also as a deterrent for cross-border
trade, if used disproportionately.
III. DOES PUBLIC POLICY PROMOTE EFFICIENCY?
If philosophy in the twentieth century is marked by its linguistic
turn, law has experienced an economic turn.  This turn came about as
a result of the intellectual contribution of Holmes and other scholars
who desired to replace general standards for legal problems in lieu of
moral blameworthiness.109  In short, the endeavor of law and econom-
ics intellectuals is to institute an economic method for the analysis of
legal problems.110  The ultimate goal is economic efficiency.
The practice of contracting between parties is highly cherished be-
cause, by properly allocating resources, the total wealth of a society
can be increased.  Prices are most efficiently determined through a
free market, which allows for freedom of contract among various play-
ers in the market.111  However—unlike some judicial opinions, includ-
ing the Supreme Court in Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern v.
Voight112—contracts are not sacred from the law and economics per-
spective; they are means to an ultimate goal, which is efficiency and
the increase of wealth.113
Scholars in this field, however, have rarely engaged the doctrine of
public policy directly although their entire area of research is directed
toward promoting the particular public policy of efficiency.114  Yet,
one relevant problem has turned out to be a vexing issue for them:
providing justifications for bans on certain types of contracts and
transactions.  In other words, why should certain external prohibi-
tions bar contracts from yielding their normal legal consequences?
109. “The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls,
and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument
of misfortune.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963); GILMORE, supra note 45, at 54.
110. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics, Public Policy and Law, 26 VIC-
TORIA UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1 (1996).
111. Id.
112. 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[I]f there is one thing which more than another public
policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have
the utmost liberty of contracting, and their contracts, when entered into freely
and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by court of justice.”
(quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, LR 19 Eq. 462, 465
(Eng. 1875))).
113. This is a moralistic approach to contract law according to some authors. See, e.g.,
Prince, supra note 36, at 164.
114. One exception is a Note in the Harvard Law Review.  Note, A Law and Economics
Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1445 (2006).
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Borrowing from this scholarship, I posit that there are three strands
of public policy conceivable under the law and economics approach.
1. Public policy as a protection for parties in the contract
(paternalism);
2. Public policy as a protection for third parties outside of the con-
tract (negative externalities); and
3. Public policy as a means for redistributive justice.
Synchronically, policy considerations are imposed on contract law
in two stages: (1) ex ante, when parties are contracting; and (2) ex post,
when there is a dispute about the contract.  At the ex ante stage, con-
tact law divides rules into two categories: default rules and mandatory
rules.  What differentiates the two types of rules is parties’ ability to
contract around them.  Parties can contract around default rules,
while mandatory rules are not contractible.  Mandatory rules refer to
rules derived from public policy; parties cannot deviate from these
rules by entering into a private contract.115  Policy considerations pre-
vent these rules from being contractible.
There is controversy over whether mandatory rules produce eco-
nomic efficiency.116  In the case of market failures—for instance,
where there is asymmetry of information—mandatory rules may fos-
ter efficiency and distributive goals.117  Willy Rice, after analyzing
state supreme court decisions on insurance contracts from 1900 to
1991—specifically those involving implied covenant of good faith
clauses—concluded that courts unwittingly discriminate against the
litigants.  One of the study’s aims is to show that mandatory rules
such as the covenant of good faith do not necessarily lead to efficiency
or distributional goals, especially because of disparate impact discrim-
ination.118  Similarly, the skepticism towards mandatory rules exists
among those scholars who view the firm as a contract or a “nexus of
115. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 609–10 (2003).
116. Id.
117. Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of Civil Justice System,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 343, 350 (A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007).
118. This is a term coined by the United States Supreme Court in the context of em-
ployment discrimination. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  Under the Court’s disparate impact analy-
sis, a Title VII plaintiff may state a prima facie employment discrimination claim
by making a statistical showing that the neutral scheme caused the hiring dis-
parity. See LEE M. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1.8, at 30 (2d
ed. 1988).  But in the context of the present discussion, a disparate impact analy-
sis permits a presumption, based on a statistical showing, that a state supreme
court’s neutral rule, practice, or policy harms members of a certain group, such as
female policyholders, automobile insurers, life insurance insurers, or excess lia-
bility insurers.
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contracts.”119  These scholars believe that mandatory rules are only
justified to prevent adverse effects on third parties.  Contracts that
result in pollution and contracts negatively affecting competition are
among those contracts that should not be enforceable.120  Yet, con-
tracts related to business or governance do not involve substantial ef-
fects for third parties and, therefore, should not be limited.
Justification for state intervention is not applicable to intra-corporate
affairs.121
In contrast, Ayres aims to show in a study that mandatory provi-
sions lead to efficiency.  He analyzes mandatory disclosure by sending
203 testers to negotiate for the purchase of a new car.  He finds that
mandatory disclosure leads to economic efficiency and reduced price
discrimination.122  However, the latter study goes to the heart of the
asymmetry of information problem rather than the first study, which
deals with the traditional covenant of good faith in contracts.  In other
words, it does not refute the presumption that some mandatory rules
do not necessarily increase economic efficiency.
In the enforcement stage, considerations related to public affairs
are part of the doctrine of public policy.  As discussed, public policy
concerns the enforcement of contracts.  There are significant overlaps
between mandatory rules and the doctrine of public policy.  However,
they are distinct from each other.  An example will clarify this distinc-
tion: even if the legislature did not criminalize prostitution, a contract
for prostitution would remain unenforceable.123  In other words, the
illegality of prostitution is recognized only if judicial resources are
used for enforcement.  Mandatory rules are designed to shape parties
behavior, while contracting and public policy is a bar to enforcing their
contractual terms where the overall objective or outcome of the con-
tract is against public policy.
So far we have realized that three possible explanations or scena-
rios can be found in the law and economics approach regarding the
issue of the public policy exception: (1) protecting parties in the con-
tract; (2) protecting third parties; or (3) advancing redistributive
119. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 159, 169–71 (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993); MICHAEL JENSEN & WILLIAM MECKLING, THEORY OF
THE FIRM, MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
8–10 (1976).  For the limits of the contract theory of the firm, see Ian Ayres, Mak-
ing a Difference: The Contractual Contribution of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1395–97 (1992).
120. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COR-
PORATE LAW 23 (1996).
121. Id. But see Ayres, supra note 119.
122. Ian Ayers, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Care Negotia-
tions, HARV. L. REV. 817, 817–22 (1991).
123. R. A. BUCKLEY, ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 90 (2d ed. 2009).
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goals.  In the following sections I analyze each explanation in depth
and at the end try to show why, in my opinion, public policy in the
enforcement state (ex post phase) should be mainly applied in cases
involving protection of third parties.
A. Protecting Parties
In the real world, parties almost never enjoy having an equal foot-
ing at the time of contracting.  People around the world hold diverse
social, political, and cultural status.  For example, a car dealer of a
famous Japanese car brand has relative economic leverage over its
buyers and could more or less incorporate its preferences in the sales
contracts.  It is similarly true for a cable service provider, which does
not face formidable competitors in a certain area.  However, these dif-
ferences and leverages do not render the contract unenforceable.  The
law protects the weaker party—in the language of law and econom-
ics—only in cases where there is serious asymmetry of information
between the parties.  One assumption of law and economics is that
contracts maximize welfare when made with perfect information re-
garding parties’ payoffs.  Protection against formation defects—such
as the infancy of a party, fraud, and, to a great extent, unconscionable
contractual terms—occur because one party is gravely under-informed
compared to the other party.  In other words, asymmetry of informa-
tion exists when one party has an informational privilege over the
other.  This informational advantage might lead to market failure.  In
his seminal article, economist George Akerlof explains how asymme-
try of information leads to market failure.124
The question is whether the doctrine of public policy should con-
cern itself with asymmetry of information between parties in contracts
or agreements.  The controversy over unconscionable terms helps us to
frame the issue more accurately.  Pursuant to unconscionability doc-
trine, courts should invalidate contracts with egregious and unjust
terms for a contracting party.125  One instance of unconscionable con-
tracts is where one party is economically and socially feeble to the
point that that the other party could easily exert influence on him or
her.  A contract for the sale of an umbrella on a rainy day for $200
instead of the usual $10 is an example of unconscionability.126  Law
and economics scholars have grappled with this because they believe
courts impose their views on the rights and duties of parties when
124. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488–89 (1970).
125. Guido Pincione, Welfare, Autonomy, and Contractual Freedom, in THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 219, 224 (Mark D. White ed., 2009).
126. Some frame it as economic duress.  The discussion on this matter is beyond the
scope of this Article.
712 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:685
invoking this doctrine.127  Alan Schwartz endeavored to limit its scope
while remaining silent about situations where unconscionability re-
sults from a lack of information.128  Richard Esptein voices a stronger
objection to this doctrine.  He posits that the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility does not serve any function beyond prohibition against fraud,
duress, and incompetence.  The only difference is that the bar for the
standard of proof is lower in the doctrine of unconscionability.  This
reduces the total error in enforcement of unjust contracts.129  Ep-
stein’s approach is dismissive of substantive unconscionability (i.e., in-
validation on grounds of unjust terms for instance unfair prices).130
In short, for Epstein the doctrine of unconscionability is acceptable
only in instances where there is some incapacity of a contracting
party, a matter that results in informational deficiency for one of the
parties.  His theory allows the courts to police the incompetency of
parties, in addition to formation defects, in a limited fashion.131
Similar to unconscionability, one presumed function of public pol-
icy is that it should protect parties where asymmetry of information
strips off the “bargain” feature of transactions.  Yet, it is doubtful that
there is a need for another doctrine to protect the information of par-
ties on their contractual payoff.  There are ample theories and safe-
guards carved into the edifice of contract law aiming to protect
symmetry of information between parties.  Fraud, economic duress,
unconscionability, and mistake are among the main theories designed
to protect parties.
However, in other aspects of the public policy doctrine—for in-
stance in the enforcement of arbitral awards—courts have no choice
but to employ the doctrine of public policy.  If judgments and awards
are based on a contract with serious asymmetry of information be-
tween parties, the only tool remaining in the courts’ toolbox is public
policy (since economic duress and unconsionability can be invoked
127. Epstein, supra note 36.
128. Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053, 1053–54 (1977). Alan Schwartz suggests four categories for non-sub-
stantive unconscionability: In the first instance, the poorer party cannot impose
his or her preferences.  In the second category, market dynamics limit the buyer’s
option.  The third instance is where the buyer is too unsophisticated to be able to
dictate his or her preferences.  Lastly, lack of information creates a situation
where a contracting party cannot make his or her preferences “either because the
information is unavailable or because the cost of finding and absorbing it exceeds,
at the margin, the value of the information.” Id. at 1054.  Schwartz argues that
the three first instances do not provide a justification to invalidate the contract.
Regarding the last category his article is silent.
129. Epstein, supra note 36, at 302.
130. His examples are add-on clauses, waiver-of-defense, exclusion of liability for con-
sequential damages, due-on-dale clauses, and termination-at-will clauses. Id. at
306–15.
131. Id. at 315.
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only in the litigation phase of contractual disputes).  In short, courts
might consider serious and significant asymmetry of information be-
tween parties when enforcing awards and judgment based on the doc-
trine of public policy.
Yet, non-enforcement should not be a punishment for the less in-
formed party because she is “less morally blameworthy.”132  The ad-
vantaged party cannot reap the benefits resulting from non-
enforcement of contracts or awards.  In contract law this has been re-
flected in the doctrine of in pari delicto.133  Under this theory the
plaintiff can recover if she is not equally in wrong with the defendant,
even if the contract is contrary to public policy.  For instance in
Karpinski v. Collins, the plaintiff had to provide kickbacks to the de-
fendant in order to receive grade-A products.134  The market dynam-
ics would not allow the plaintiff to obtain a similar product without
paying the kickback.  Notwithstanding the illegality of kickbacks, the
court enforced the contract.135  In this case the plaintiff knew about
the illegality of kickbacks.  But it is similarly applicable, mutatis mu-
tandis, to a situation where the plaintiff does not have information
about the illegality involved in transactions.
B. Protecting Third Parties
The second function of public policy in law and economics man-
dates that negative externalities be avoided in contract law.  Negative
externalities or external diseconomies refer to situations where pro-
duction of a product (in economics) or exercise of a right (in law) incurs
costs that outweigh the benefits it gives to the society.  A classical ex-
ample is pollution.  A plant in the middle of a city would create costs
from polluting the city that are greater than the benefits it confers to
the welfare of the society.  In contrast, pollution from cars is tolerated
because of the benefits it has on transportation.  Prevention of nega-
tive externalities is one economic rationale for the involvement of gov-
ernments in economics and law.136  In other words, states intervene
132. McIntosh v. Mills, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Medina v. Safe-
Guard Prods., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 672, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
133. On the doctrine of in pari delicto, see generally T.S. Ellis III, In Defense of In Pari
Delicto, 56 A.B.A. J. 346 (1970).
134. Karpinski v. Collins, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967).
135. Id. at 849.
136. Alfred Marshall coined the notion of externalities and his pupil, Arthur C. Pigou,
developed Marshall’s theory and based his welfare economics on the notion of
externalities. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (5th ed. 1907); A.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).  Pigou favors taxing the activities
which create negative externalities and providing tax breaks for activities such
as education, which result in positive externalities. JOHN E. ANDERSON, PUBLIC
FINANCE 110–15 (2011).  R. H. Coase disagrees.  He believes we can reduce exter-
nalities by reducing transaction costs, which allow the people creating the exter-
nalities and those affected to bargain.  R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
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by enacting laws and enforcing various standards to prevent the nega-
tive externalities as much as possible.137
Courts should engage in balancing various interests in order to as-
certain the best possible outcome when negative externalities are at
issue.  Laws protecting against unfair competition serve as an illumi-
nating example.  Companies should not engage in tying arrangements
that minimize total welfare by reducing competition in the market.
The Microsoft decision brought before the D.C. Circuit established the
balancing test in the area of antitrust in which the burden of proof
was divided between plaintiff and defendant.138  In this case, the
United States brought a case against Microsoft for violation of the
Sherman Act on multiple grounds: Microsoft maintained a monopoly
in the market for Intel compatible PC systems, it attempted to gain a
monopoly in the internet explorers’ market, and it tied its two prod-
ucts—i.e., Windows and Internet Explorer (IE)—illegally.  On the lat-
ter issue (the alleged tying arrangement), the court delegated the
balancing task to the parties to evaluate whether the anticompetitive
harm of the Java design is outweighed by the efficiencies that resulted
from that design to society.139  Following the Jefferson Parish case,
the Court declared that tying arrangements should not be subject to
per se analysis because they do not necessarily stifle competition.140
J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960).  There is also strong skepticism as to the functionality
of governments in reducing externalities from the public choice school of econom-
ics. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d
ed. 1951); DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958);
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECO-
NOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY &
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (2007); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); WILLIAM H. RIKER,
THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
137. JOHN B. TAYLOR, ECONOMICS 399 (5th ed. 2007).  Economists worry about positive
externalities as well.  Positive externalities happen when a product or right has a
positive spill over, yet the costs are not efficiently distributed.  For instance, a
neighbor who renovates the lobby out of pocket is benefiting the other neighbors.
Yet, the market place has failed in equally distributing the costs among all stake-
holders, in our example, the neighbors. UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROP-
ERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 60 (2000).
138. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Sangin Park, Mar-
ket Power Revisited, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 8–9 (Richard O. Zerbe &
John B. Kirwood eds., 2012); WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE
MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE
195–96 (2007).
139. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 96 (“[P]laintiffs must show that Microsoft’s conduct
was, on balance, anticompetitive.  Microsoft may of course offer precompetitive
justifications, and it is plaintiffs’ burden to show that the anticompetitive effect of
the conduct outweighs its benefit.”).
140. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (“It is far too late
in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that cer-
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Central to the tying issue was whether the Microsoft’s action harmed
or benefited the public and whether the public interest was served bet-
ter or worse by Microsoft’s action.  The court aptly applied a balancing
test to weigh the different interests at stake.
Stifling competition is an example of a negative externality, which
should be avoided in contracts and in the enforcement of awards.
Courts ought to take a similar approach in regards to other negative
externalities.  The Microsoft case serves as valuable precedent for sim-
ilar cases that might arise under the rubric of the public policy doc-
trine.  When dealing with public interest matters, the doctrine of
public policy allows courts to weigh the interest of parties (or one
party) in enforcing the contract or award vis-a`-vis the interest of soci-
ety in non-enforcement.141  Protecting society in this sense is the prin-
cipal mandate of the public policy doctrine under the law and
economics approach.
C. Protecting Redistributive Justice
Lastly, and most controversially, public policy might serve to pro-
mote the redistributive feature of law.  Generally speaking, in the law
and economics camp the basic idea centers on contracts that produce
efficient results, which subsequently result in a surplus.142  This sur-
plus could be redistributed throughout society.  Thus, in a nutshell,
there should be no redistribution concerns at the contract level.
Courts should not render any contracts unenforceable simply due to
distributive concerns.  Fried, one of the proponents of this approach,
maintains: “[R]edistribution is not a burden to be borne in a random,
ad hoc way by those who happen to cross paths with persons poorer
than themselves.”143  Similar views have been expressed to buttress
the idea that redistribution is a business of the state through the tax
and welfare system, not through courts.144
Although Posner certainly shares Fried’s general claim that the
courts ought not to be the locus of the redistributive policy, he does
argue that in the area of usury law judicial intervention to limit pri-
vate choice would have a beneficial redistributive effect.  He believes
tain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and
therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”).
141. See infra section V.A.
142. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674 (1994) (arguing
that efficient legal rule leaves all individuals equally well off and leaves the gov-
ernment with a surplus).
143. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
106 (1981).
144. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examina-
tion of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1321 (1980); Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 142, at 674–75.
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over-reliance on the welfare system prompts risky borrowing behav-
ior, which racks up the costs of the welfare system.  He believes that
states are committed both to promote the free market and to amelio-
rate poverty through welfare systems.  He argues that a “hands-off”
approach to the first function, i.e., free market promotion, will incur
heavy costs on the second function, which is redistribution, because it
incentivizes suboptimal risk taking.145  The long-held ban on usury in
common law is a good example of how the courts can limit reliance on
welfare.  Usury is a practice in which the creditor imposes higher-
than-market interest rates on the debtor.  In the case of Dunham v.
Gould, Chancellor Kent expressed a very strong and brief justification
for usury:
Lord Redesdale said in 1803, many years after Jeremy Bentham, to whom the
learned counsel referred for an able defense of usury, had first published his
letters, that the statue of usury was founded on great principles of public pol-
icy.  It was intended, he said, to protect distressed men, by facilitating the
means of procuring money on reasonable terms, and by refusing to men who
sit idle as high a rate of interest, without hazard, as those can procure who
employ money in hazardous undertakings of trade and manufactures.  I trust
that theoretic reformers have not yet attained, on this subject any decided
victory over public opinion . . . . The statute of usury is constantly interposing
its warning voice between the creditor and the debtor, even in their most se-
cret and dangerous negotiations, and teaches a lesson of moderation to the
one, and offers its protecting arm to the other.  I am not willing to withdraw
such a sentinel.146
High-risk creditors, mainly impoverished people according to Pos-
ner,147 tend to take loans with high interest rates.  The chances of
their default are high, eventually subjecting them to the welfare sys-
tem.  Usury law is to protect this risky behavior and ultimately help
with the retributive function of the state.148  Posner’s idea adds a new
wrinkle to the underlying policies courts should take into account
when adjudicating contractual issues.  He reintroduced usury law as a
modern theory justifiable under the law and economics perspective.
However, it is not clear whether redistributive justice requires a
separate consideration besides what we discussed for negative exter-
nalities.  The redistributive concerns are related to the costs society
has to pay if careless individuals engage in risky behaviors.  It is
linked to balancing societal interests in benefits and the costs of en-
forcing a certain risky contract or risky award.  If enforcing a certain
type of risky contract ultimately eventuates in unbearably high costs
145. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconsciona-
bility Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract.
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 285 (1995).
146. JAMES AVERY WEBB, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY, AND, INCIDENTALLY, OF
INTEREST 12–13 (1899) (citations omitted).
147. Posner, supra note 145, at 318.
148. Id. at 316–17.
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on the redistributive mechanism of a particular state, it could be
barred from enforcement under the doctrine of public policy.  Cer-
tainly, one contract or an arbitral award can hardly incur such a high
cost, but judicial enforcement of that type of contract or award could
snowball the conclusions of similar contracts or the issuance of similar
awards in future.
In summary, this Part analyzed three underlying justifications for
the doctrine of public policy under the law and economics approach.
First, it may protect the parties’ aim to regulate informational defects
between them at the time of concluding agreements.  Considering
other mechanisms and legal theories designed to protect parties in
this regard, there is no need for the doctrine of public policy to engage
itself with this matter.  Second, it could protect third parties, which is
the most important function of the doctrine of public policy.  It shel-
ters society from potential negative externalities derived from the en-
forcement of contracts or arbitral awards.  The last category addresses
an essential element of today’s society, which is redistributive justice.
However, as described, the concerns of redistributive justice could be
addressed under the negative externality rubric by utilizing the bal-
ancing test.
IV. THE LEADING ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY
Thus far, we have reviewed the historical genesis of the doctrine of
public policy and its development in the common law.  In Part II we
discussed the impact of legal theory and the emergence of the welfare
state on the metamorphosis of the public policy exception in the twen-
tieth century.  In the preceding Part, we scrutinized the law and eco-
nomics analysis of the doctrine of public policy in order to grasp the
economical justifications for the doctrine.  In this Part, however, we
will observe the insufficiency of the law and economics approach in
dealing with all instances of the public policy exception.  This Part
aims to show that there is more in the doctrine of public policy than a
simple cost-benefit analysis of the parties’ interests vis-a`-vis societal
interests.  In the first section, I argue that policy arguments in courts
are inevitable.  The doctrine of public policy has a leading role, not a
passive one, in our judicial system.
A. Incompleteness of the Law and Economics Approach
Imagine the following scenario: An immigrant, who is on the brink
of being deported by authorities, approaches an employer and asks her
to sign a document certifying that she is hiring the immigrant.  The
employer does not need the immigrant and his skills, yet signs the
document because the immigrant is a minority in his home country
and is likely to be persecuted upon his return to his homeland.  After a
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short period, the relationship between them turns sour, and the immi-
grant petitions the court to enforce the employment contract in order
to reap the benefits of it.  The employer attests that he lied because of
the likely persecution of the immigrant in his home country.  The
court faces a dilemma: whether to enforce an inefficient contract that
is contrary to public policy or prevent the probable human rights vio-
lations of the immigrant’s government.  The law and economics ap-
proach and balancing test is not much help here.  In fact, some law
and economics scholars believe immigration results in negative exter-
nalities per se, although that is not the common view.149  However,
would it be fair?
In an actual case, a Jewish individual bribed an official in France
in order to enter the United States.150  The official promised that he
would secure him a visa before the Nazi army reached France in ex-
change for money.  The plaintiff provided $28,000 worth of jewelry to
the official.  The official absconded the jewelry without fulfilling his
promise.  Later, upon meeting the defendant in New York, the plain-
tiff sued the defendant for the return of his jewelry.  The defendant
claimed that the contract was void based on the public policy doctrine.
The court rejected the motion, declaring: “[T]here is no question of
public policy involved in a case like this where a man is attempting to
save himself from an enemy who has violated all the laws of civiliza-
tion.”151  This case is rightly decided.  Yet, scholars using the law and
economics approach have trouble justifying this case.152  Although not
explicitly invoked by the court, it is the doctrine of public policy that
guided the court to reach this decision.  As is discussed later,153 it is
the public-morality strand of public policy that led the court to rule in
favor of the plaintiff.  For the purpose of this section, this case illumi-
nates one aspect of judicial decision-making that is overlooked by the
149. O¨RN B. BODVARSSON & HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION:
THEORY AND POLICY 178–79 (2009).
150. Liebman v. Rosenthal, 57 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945), aff’d, 59
N.Y.S.2d 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945).
151. Id. at 877.  A similar case is Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14
N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1938), in which an employee was dismissed pursuant to non-
Aryan laws before the expiration of his employment contract.  Subsequently, the
employee sued for indemnification in U.S. court.  The lower court invoked the
doctrine of public policy to argue that non-Aryan laws are not applicable and the
employee is entitled to compensation.  The Court of Appeals of New York rejected
the public policy argument because of jurisdictional concerns. Id.; see also, Nuss-
baum, supra note 44, at 1030–31 (discussing the public policy doctrine in the
American legal system).
152. “The result of the case seems institutively correct, but its underlying argument
should be tightly constrained to its facts . . . . [I]t also injects uncertainty of non
enforcement into what would otherwise have been clearly unenforceable con-
tracts, which can have negative welfare effects.”  Note, supra note 114, at
1452–53.
153. See infra section V.B.
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literature of law and economics: it goes to the heart of judicial
activism.154
The law and economics movement cannot entirely capture all as-
pects of public policy.  Its methodology is highly useful for dissecting
various types of public policy in law.  It also provides us with a balanc-
ing method in cases where negative impacts arise from contracts or
their enforcement.  However, law and economics cannot fully explain
the reasons, let’s say, why contracts against prostitution, or even brib-
ery are unenforceable.  The approach lacks methodological tools to
clarify the reason a profitable arms sale contract with North Korea
should be barred from enforcement when it creates numerous jobs in a
stagnant economy.  There is more to the doctrine of public policy than
merely balancing economic interests.  Not all aspects of social living
can be reduced to cost-benefit analysis.  Moreover, the court’s role
should not be restricted to a mere calculation of various interests.
This brings us to the other aspects of public policy, which are—
what I call—“educative” and “protective.”  In this respect, courts have
a more active role and there is no need for balancing.  Judges have a
crucial role where a basic moral norm of society is in jeopardy or there
is a potential threat to public safety.  It might be argued that even in
these instances courts follow the balancing approach.  Enforcing a
morally egregious contract or award that will jeopardize public safety
is clearly outweighed by societal interest in non-enforcement of the
contract or the award.  However, there is a fine distinction between
the two balancing approaches.  The first one relies on economic analy-
sis (the cost-benefit approach) of the various interests at stake.  In a
case of a plant causing pollution to a neighborhood, data could be
shown about the benefits the neighborhood receives from job creation
versus the costs incurred on the health of its residents as a result of
pollution.  The same analysis could not be done when issues of moral-
ity and security are at stake.  Looking back at Liebman, it was abso-
lutely impossible for the court to collect numerical data on the costs
incurred as a result of the moral wrongdoing of the officer.  Similar
issues exist for cases involving public security yet they are subtly dif-
ferent.  Public security concerns are—and ought to be—taken seri-
ously.  The sensitivity of the matter requires that even slight chance of
threat to public safety overrides the normal cost-benefit analysis.  The
154. For discussions on judicial activism, see, for example, Robert M. Cover, The Ori-
gins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982);
Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (2004); J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society—Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1968);  P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561 (1984); Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions
of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236 (1982).
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logic of public morality and public safety is distinct from prevailing
cost-benefit logic associated with ascertaining the public interest.155
B. Public Policy Arguments in Courts
Montesquieu famously said that a judge is “no more than the
mouth that produces the words of law.”156  American legal thought,
and in particular judicial philosophy, took a completely opposite tra-
jectory from this approach to law.  Inspired by pragmatism, Holmes
was one of the first prominent American legal thinkers to lay the foun-
dation for American realism.  Holmes believed that judges should not
follow the law blindly.  Recognizing “judicial legislation,” Holmes pos-
ited that judges should take into “consideration of what is expedient
for the community concerned.”157  According to him, the “secret root”
of law is the core from which “law draws all the juices of life.”158
Holmes suggested that judges extrapolate the underlying public policy
of laws rather than apply them blindly without any intellectual en-
deavor.  Judges should form the law, not simply follow it.159  They
could shape the public policy of their community: “Judges as well as
others should openly discuss the legislative principles upon which
their decisions must always rest in the end, and should base their
judgments upon broad considerations of policy to which the traditions
of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty years
ago.”160
This view reverberates with the claim that judges inevitably have
to enter the area of political arguments.161  Historically, in 1750 Lord
155. For an in-depth discussion on this matter, see infra Part V.
156. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 209 (Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. Cal.
Press 1977) (1750).
157. HOLMES, supra note 109, at 32.
158. Id.
159. This tradition has influenced other legal systems as well.  Justice Barak, the for-
mer president of the Supreme Court of Israel posits, “I reject the contention that
the judge merely states the law and does not create it. It is a fictitious and even a
childish approach.”  Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 23 (2002). Barak believes that a
supreme court justice should take into consideration: “(1) the coherence of the
system in which he operates; (2) the powers and limitations of the institution of
the judiciary as defined within that system; and (3) the way in which his role is
perceived.” Id. at 30.
160. DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSAT-
LANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 241 (2013).
161. Chief Justice Shaw gave a classic expression to this view in Norway Plains Co. v.
Boston & Maine Railroad, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263 (1854):
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that,
instead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive pro-
visions, and adapted to the precise circumstances of particular cases,
which would become obsolete and fail, when the practice and course of
business, to which they apply, should cease or change, the common law
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HarWicke realized this ramification of the doctrine of public policy for
the judicial branch, a task that involved “[p]olitical arguments, in the
fullest sense of the word, as they concern the government of a na-
tion . . . .”162  However, with the empowerment of a democratic parlia-
ment, this view lost its appeal.  As we observed in Part II, skepticism
towards the doctrine of public policy became the prevailing paradigm.
This skepticism reached its culmination when the House of Lords sug-
gested that courts should no longer engage in creating new categories
of public interest in situations where they find the legislative policy
undesirable.163
A recurrent objection to the doctrine of public policy is its interfer-
ence with the legislative role of the legislature.  Yet, this argument
does not seem to conclusively rule out the possibility and desirability
of judicial interference.  After all, discovering the “legislative intent”
seems to be highly difficult, if not impossible.  As Posner mentions, it
is more “knowledge by empathy” than it is reading the mind of the
legislator.164
John Bell suggests three models under which policy arguments in
judicial decisions are justified: (1) The Consensus Model: Under this
theory, judges are voices for the communal values of the society and
ought to articulate them.165  This follows from a basic distinction be-
tween the judicial and legislative branch.  The legislature could pass
laws that do not reflect popular opinion, whereas the judicial branch is
restrained to conform to the consensus of society at large.  Judges
should not enter areas that are contentious and where no consensus
exists on fundamental values.166
(2) The Rights Model: This model is based on Ronald Dwokin’s the-
ory.  Dworkin keenly observes that in practice it is impossible to rule
out the possibility of judicial decision-making.  Moreover he objects to
the mainstream idea that judicial lawmaking is “parasitic” on the leg-
islative branch.167  He distinguishes between policy and principle in
order to portray the distinct role of the legislative branch vis-a`-vis the
consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles, founded on reason,
natural justice, and enlightened public policy, modified and adapted to
the circumstances of all the particular cases which fall within it.
Id. at 267.
162. Chesterfield v. Janssen [1750] 1 Atk. 339, 352 (Eng.).
163. Janson v. Driefontein Consol. Mines, Ltd. [1902] 27 A.C. 484; JOHN BELL, POLICY
ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 157 (1983).
164. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 851
(1987). Posner has voiced his view on intent in other fields of law as well.  In
intentional torts, he believes intent does not play a role besides alluding to cer-
tain characteristics of tortious acts. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 149–50 (1987).
165. BELL, supra note 163, at 11.
166. Id. at 12.
167. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106 (1997).
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judiciary.  Policy arguments refer to a political decision that advances
some collective goal of the community as a whole.  On the other hand,
arguments of principle vindicate a political decision by resorting to a
group or individual right.168  An argument for a tax increase on
wealthy people is an argument of policy.  In contrast, arguments cen-
tered on antidiscrimination are arguments of principle.  Dworkin
posits that legislative programs—especially complex legislation—
often have both aspects of policy and principle.  Alternatively, judicial
decisions “characteristically are and should be generated by principle
not policy.”169  Dworkin cleverly pinpoints a distinctive feature of the
judiciary as a guardian of rights vis-a`-vis collective welfare.  These
rights could derive from constitution, statutes, or common law.170
(3) The Interstitial Legislator Model: Proponents of this model ar-
gue that judges essentially legislate when dealing with hard cases.171
In hard cases, judges confront a number of rules and standards that
might run counter to the existing law.  Taking into account the inter-
est of society at large, judges adjudicate based on their judgments.  Al-
though inconsistent at times, these theories show that there is
something distinctive about judicial policy-making.172  It cannot and
should not be eliminated.  There is always an empty space in law that
should be filled with judgments of ethics and policy by courts.173
The doctrine of public policy has remained one of the few avenues
of judicial policy-making.  Subordination of judicial policy-making to
the legislature runs the risk of weakening the judicial branch.174
From its early history, the doctrine of public policy was viewed as a
separate category of the law.  In 1853, the House of Lords opined that
public policy holds a different meaning from the “policy of the law.”  It
rejected the majority view in Egerton v. Brownlow, which found public
168. Id. at 107.
169. Id. at 84.
170. BELL, supra note 164, at 15.
171. Article I(2) of the Swiss Code of 1807 exemplifies this model: “[I]f no rule can be
derived from the statute, the judge should decide in accordance with the rule
which he would promulgate if he were the legislator.”  Richard Posner strongly
objects to this model as both unedifying and misleading. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 164, at 130–31.  This view leads to ontological skepticism on the exis-
tence of intent and even objectivity.  Posner, supra note 164, at 866–71.
172. Barak, supra note 159, at 116.
173. Posner, supra note 164, at 891.
174. Justice Barak gives an illuminating example on the role the doctrine of public
policy can play.  In 1994, a dispute came before the Supreme Court of Israel in
which two political parties of Israel signed a “coalition agreement.”  The agree-
ment stipulated that when any supreme court statutory-interpretation decision
changed the status quo on religion and state, the two parties would vote to re-
store the status quo.  The majority opinion held the contract was not contrary to
public policy.  Conversely, Justice Barak believed that this agreement reduced
the confidence in the judicial branch and it was therefore against public policy.
Barak, supra note 159, at 135.
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policy and the policy of the law to be equivalent notions—meaning
both refer to the object and policy of a particular law.175  An example
helps illustrate this fine distinction.  In Adams v. Howerton176 the is-
sue was whether a same-sex couple could qualify under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act to apply for legal permanent resident status.
The couple was legally married by a minister in Colorado.  The court
opined that the marriage should be valid under both state law and the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  After investigating the legis-
lative history of the INA, the court found that Congress’s intent was
clearly not to recognize same-sex marriages.177  The Ninth Circuit did
a thorough and convincing investigation on the “intent” of the legisla-
ture and policy of the INA.  Yet, it is not clear whether it was a sound
public policy, especially since the court could resort to states’ exclusive
power to regulate domestic relations.  In other words, the policy of law
in this case overshadows the public policy, which resulted in a weak
decision.
In summary, the judicial branch’s endeavor cannot and should not
simply be to investigate the intent of the lawmakers.  If so, it sacrifices
its inherent and distinctive feature.  The doctrine of public policy
should be seen in this light.
V. WHICH PUBLIC?
Thus far, one thing is apparent from our discussion: the doctrine of
public policy does not offer a simple, overarching theory.  It is indefin-
able, similar to many other concepts in law such as justice and fair-
ness.  As with justice and fairness, public policy is pleaded and
referred to in courts by lawyers and judges on a daily basis.  Several
scholarly pieces attempted to classify the doctrine of public policy from
various angles.178  Yet, none of the definitions and classifications have
proven to be satisfactory and effective.  It is partly due to the protean
nature of the doctrine of public policy.  Additionally, however, the con-
fusion about this topic arises from the fact that the scholarship has
not surgically dissected the very notion of public policy.  Hardly any
theory has tried to open the black box of the public policy defense.
This Part attempts to fill the void by identifying three logics that are
at play in the doctrine of public policy.
I categorize public policy into three strands: public interest, public
morality, and public security.  This approach is both descriptive and
normative.  On the descriptive side, the triangle look facilitates our
175. Knight, supra note 20, at 216.  This view has been contested since then. Id. at
216–17.
176. 673 F.2d 1036, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015).
177. Id.
178. See supra section II.D.
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understanding of cases involving public policy while helping us make
sense of seemingly incongruent cases.  On the normative side, this tri-
partite framework provides us with theoretical tools to better critique
cases involving public policy matters both nationally and internation-
ally.  Furthermore, this classification is designed to serve as a
roadmap for future cases involving issues of public policy as applied to
private legal arrangements.
A. Public Interest: Balancing
Public policy is first and foremost perceived as a reflection of the
people’s will.  In a democracy and under social contract theory, public
policy is an incarnation of the will of the people.  From the eighteenth
century onwards, people’s rule emerged as the determinant of the pub-
lic policy of states.179  Governments should enforce public policies that
reflect the interest of all, enacted by the representatives of the people.
It ensues from a belief that within government the legislative branch
should determine policies that regulate public affairs.  All seem to
agree with Montesquieu that “the great advantage of representatives
is their being capable of discussing affairs.”180  The “affairs,” accord-
ing to Montesquieu, are best served when the people elect representa-
tives from each town.181  The legislative branch is a venue where
people from diverse backgrounds shape the public policies of the gov-
ernment.  Because of the diversity of opinions, the enacted policies em-
anate from the will of the people.  The “general will” constitutes
sovereignty that is indestructible and inalienable.182  Setting public
policies is not only a manifestation of sovereignty but also a critical
component of it.
Increasingly enough, the philosophical approach of public interest
shifted to economic analysis in the twentieth century.183  Along with
the triumph of the neo-liberalism paradigm, public interest has been
179. Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a Right of Humanita-
rian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL INTERVENTION 21, 30 (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995)
(showing that the Enlightenment moved toward a rational-secular conception of
legitimacy, which caused popular participation in setting the public policy);
GENEVIE`VE NOOTENS, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST: POLITICS, CONTENTION,
AND IDEAS 42 (2013).
180. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 156, at 204.
181. Id.
182. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 23 (1947).
183. It is fascinating to note that for early theorists of sovereignty, the fact that deci-
sions of a sovereign are dependent on achieving certain interests undermines the
very meaning of sovereignty as an “ultimate” decision-maker.  Kratochwil, supra
note 179, at 24; see also Richard H. Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Reg-
ulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43–46 (1995) (explaining the role of cost-bene-
fit analysis and comparative risk assessment in today’s regulatory choices of the
US).
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interpreted and applied in light of economic analysis.  Public policies
aim to increase the pie, maximize profits, and increase opportunities
for the populace.  Policies enacted by legislative branches and enforced
by governments should at least wholly or partially conform to some
level of economic rationality.184  The issue of undocumented immi-
grants serves as a good example.  The pros and cons of providing edu-
cation, health care, and temporary jobs to undocumented immigrants
revolve around economic rationales.  The focal point of the discussion
centers on the method that could result in higher benefits for society
while imposing less costs on it.185  In short, it is the logic of Homo
Economicus—economic human—that constitutes this order of public
policy.186
Following the discussion in Part III, the balancing (law and eco-
nomics) approach should be the main method of dealing with matters
involving this strand of public policy as they appear in judicial pro-
ceedings.  Courts should refrain from enforcing private legal acts such
as contracts, foreign arbitral awards, and foreign judgments that have
been obtained as a result of asymmetry of information between parties
or that might prompt negative externalities.187
A closer look at contracts, let’s say in the technology sector, clearly
directs us to the perplexing and often conflicting public policies at
play.  Policies promulgated and pursued by the government and judi-
ciary cover a wide-range of goals: respecting parties’ wills by enforcing
the contract, promoting innovation through protecting intellectual
property rights, safeguarding environmental concerns by prohibiting
non-biodegradable materials, maintaining competition through
preventing anticompetitive measures, and many other such interests.
Antitrust cases are good examples.  In Part III, we looked at the
famous case of US v. Microsoft to better understand the law and eco-
184. “Indeed, rational choice theory has itself become, if not quite the orthodox of ap-
proach to policy analysis, at the very least the dominant yardstick against which
to assess explanations of the policy process.”  Steven Griggs, Rational Choice in
Public Policy: The Theory in Critical Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY
ANALYSIS: THEORY, POLITICS, AND METHODS 173 (Jack Rabin ed., 2007).
185. See, e.g., HANS JOHNSON & LAURA HILL, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., ILLEGAL IMMI-
GRATION 7–10 (2011), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J9XT-45FW; Lisa
Pen˜aloza, Immigrant Consumers, Marketing and Public Policy Considerations in
the Global Economy, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 83, 83–94 (1995).
186. WILLIAM DIXON & DAVID J. WILSON, A HISTORY OF HOMO ECONOMICUS: THE NA-
TURE OF THE MORAL IN ECONOMIC THEORY (2012).
187. See supra Part III; see also Freedman Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 784
F. Supp. 167, 178 (D.N.J. 1992) (“A contract may be set aside where its purpose is
contrary to common good or it contains unconscionable terms that are product of
unequal bargaining power of parties.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598,
601 (N.J. 1973) (“In such a situation courts will not hesitate to declare void as
against public policy grossly unfair contractual provisions which clearly tend to
the injury of the public in some way.”).
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nomics approach in public policy, as well as the balancing test
method.188  Let’s look at another example in this section, inspired
from real cases involving the Intel Corporation189: Imagine a famous
computer chip manufacturer signs a contract with a reputable laptop
company to undertake most of their losses as a result of using the
manufacturer’s chips.  The competitor of the computer chip manufac-
turer has gained momentum and has turned into a nightmare for the
manufacturer.  Instead of facing the nemesis and improving their
products, the manufacturer signs contracts that give out dollar incen-
tives for its laptop company consumers to utilize its chips.  Now,
things turn sour and a judge has to decide whether this “kickback”
contract is enforceable.  There is nothing morally reprehensible re-
garding this contract.  The judge, however, has to balance many public
policies: respect for the will of parties and their freedom to contract,
maintaining healthy competition in the industry, protecting innova-
tion and creativity, and other considerations.  It proves to be a taxing
task for the judge.  That is why I posit it is the parties who should
shoulder the brunt of conducting the balancing and the judge should
act as an ultimate arbiter.
In summary, this strand of public policy is an a-historical, a-politi-
cal and a-ethical approach to public policy.  The focus rests on the
costs involved in employing the executive power of states, as well as
the societal cost in bearing the consequences of enforcement of a pri-
vate legal act or award.  These costs should be juxtaposed with the
interests of the parties and what society receives from enforcement of
the legal act or award.  The majority of cases fall under this category.
The role of judges in cases involving this strand of public policy should
be limited and the parties should carry the burden of producing docu-
ments that prove divergent interests from enforcement, partial en-
forcement, or non-enforcement of contracts or awards.
B. Public Morality: Educating
Protection of public morality was the original idea behind the doc-
trine of public policy at common law.  As we discussed, historically,
public policy concerns arose in the context of legal acts that were en-
counter commune ley.190  Communal values on which society was es-
tablished should not be encroached through private acts of two or
more parties.  A famous Latin maxim best describes this strand of
188. See supra section III.B.
189. Ashlee Vance, State Accuses Intel in an Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009,
at B1.  For a series of cases involving the Intel Corporation for its alleged an-
ticompetitive measures see, for example, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 540 U.S.
1003 (2003); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 512 U.S. 1205 (1994).
190. See supra Part II.
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public policy: ex turpi causa non oritur actio (“from dishonorable cause
an action does not arise”).191
Courts use various phrases to employ this strand of public policy.
Some define public policy as the “most basic notion of morality and
justice.”192  Others have invoked this strand of public policy by using
terms such as “common sense,” “common conscience,” “public morals,”
and the like.193  The theory of pure fountain194 also emanates from
this perspective on public policy.  No courts should taint their hands
191. David Plessner, Public Policy in the Law of Contracts, 29 CENT. L.J. 306 (1889)
(“[T]here is no principle of law better settled, more frequently applied and more
preservative of the integrity of the law and the good order and the best interests
of society than that embodied in the maxim, ex turpi causa non oritur actio.”); see
also George Schwarzenberger, The Conceptual Apparatus of International Law,
in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 685, 706 (Ronald St., J.
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 1983) (discussing maxims derived from
English law, Roman law, and international customary law).
192. See supra note 22.
193. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 352 F.3d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 2003) (not-
ing “only dominant public policy” will “justify the invalidation of a contract as
contrary to that policy,” manifested by “long governmental practice or statutory
enactments, or [by] violations of obvious ethical or moral standards”); Application
of Whitehaven S.F., LLC v. Spangler, 45 F. Supp. 3d 333, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“If
one party wants to show that a certain act violates public policy that is not the
law of the state, then it has to establish that such an act would violate ‘some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal expressed in them.’” (quoting Schultz
v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985))); Deputy v. Lehman Bros.
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“Public policy is a “broad concept
embodying the community common sense and common conscience.’” (quoting
Eckes v. Keith, 420 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988))); Am. Home Assurance Co.
v. Cohen, 815 F. Supp. 365, 370 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (“The term ‘public pol-
icy,’ . . . embraces all acts or contracts which tend clearly to injure the public
health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administra-
tion of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to
feel.” (quoting LaPoint v. Richards, 402 P.2d 585 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965))); In re
Cherokee Run Country Club Inc., 430 B.R. 281, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009) (“The
courts have held that a contract is not contrary to public policy ‘unless the Gen-
eral Assembly has declared it to be so, or unless the consideration of the contract
is contrary to good morals and contrary to law.’” (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v.
Brooks, 328 S.E. 705 (Ga. 1985))); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Challenge Constr.
Corp., 704 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78 (D. P.R. 2009) (“Parties may agree to any terms and
conditions so long as they are not contrary to the law, moral, or public order.”).
194. This theory is reflected in Lord Chief Justice’s opinion in Collins v. Blantern:
“[N]o polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice.  Whoever is a party
to an unlawful contract, if he hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in
pursuance thereof, . . . you shall not have a right of action when you come into a
Court of Justice in this unclean manner to recover it back.”  [1767] 95 Eng. Rep.
852 (K.B.).  This theory is employed as a justification for the doctrine of public
policy. See, e.g., John W. Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions—
Reasons for and Against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 35–46 (1946).
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by lending help to private acts that are injurious to basic public
morality.
The economic interest of the society at large is not of utmost impor-
tance in this strand of public policy.  Winfield refers to a paradox that
partly explains the logic of the public morality category: “[B]ut it leads
in practice to the paradox that in many cases what seem to be in con-
templation is the interest of one section only of the public, and a small
section at that.”195  He continues that “[m]any questions of public pol-
icy are profoundly uninteresting to the whole community.”196  To un-
derstand this paradox we should take into consideration that the
public morality aspect of the doctrine of public policy requires a more
active and leading role for judges.  The interest of the society at large
is one consideration among many in this category.  In contrast to the
public interest, the methodology employed should not be law and eco-
nomics, specifically not the balancing approach.  Judges are agents for
transformation in this regard and should adopt a critical, and even
natural law approach to the case in front of them.  By “critical ap-
proach,” I suggest judges employ their personal critical reasoning
when analyzing the ethical issue before them.  This goes to the heart
of judicial activism197 and the leading role of the doctrine of public
policy.198  In short, this is the strand of public policy—pertaining to
homo ethicus199—in which judges have additional discretion.
Public morality has also undergone paradigm shifts.  As we dis-
cussed in Part II, through time public morality has been interpreted in
light of states’ morality rather than through societal norms.  Modern
philosophy, mainly German idealism, transformed the notion of public
morality into a state-centric notion.  This metamorphosis could be
traced in the ideas of Kant and Hegel.  Kant propounded the idea that
personal morality can only flourish in a civil society.  States promul-
gate and endorse certain ethical norms such as freedom and justice,
thereby creating an environment for private morality to thrive.200  It
is in the shadow of a state’s morality that individuals may nourish
private morality.  This idea is also traceable in Hegel.  For him, “[T]o
be ethical is to live in accordance with the ethics of one’s country.”201
Hegel agrees with Aristotle and Plato that individual morality best
195. Winfield, supra note 26, at 92.
196. Id.
197. See supra note 154.
198. See supra Part IV.
199. “Man, as Homo Sapiens Ethicus, is distinguished by his newly acquired interest
in moral matters and by his attempts to understand the world.” ANTHONY B.
KELLY, THE PROCESS OF THE COSMOS: PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY
76 (1999).
200. ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT’S ETHICS, 24 (1994).
201. ANDREW BUCHWALTER, DIALECTICS, POLITICS, AND THE CONTEMPORARY VALUE OF
HEGEL’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 157 (2012).
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flourishes when it strives to promote the welfare of the political or-
der.202  Morality is political and can be best attained when it is shaped
and achieved through the furtherance of the goals of the political
unity.  For Hegel the state is the perfect form of human community in
which people can fulfill their individuality.203  Sovereign states are
the culmination of the historical development of man’s morality and
control of himself and his environment.204  Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s
morality stems from his statist-communitarian perspective on ethics:
“The state has a primary and absolute entitlement to be sovereign and
independent power in the eyes of others, i.e., to be recognized by
them.”205
For the purpose of our discussion it is important to note that the
concept of public policy has also been affected by this shift from socie-
tal morality to a more statist notion.  This approach disadvantages
courts since it reduces their role in finding societal norms.  In other
words, as practice shows, courts have not been active in investigating
public morality and seem to pay only lip service to safeguarding it.206
The judge’s hand in deciding this strand of public policy should not be
limited.  It is one of the few judicial avenues in which communal val-
ues—which are not necessarily propounded by states—are saved.  Im-
agine a contract that directly or indirectly affects the culture of an
Indian tribe by establishing a business contrary to their beliefs.  Or,
imagine a contract for the establishment of a casino in a Muslim
neighborhood in Pennsylvania.  The contracts clearly do not violate
the state’s morality.  It is the judges, not the parties, who should un-
dertake the hard task of determining whether the contracts are injuri-
ous to the communal values.  In short, public morality should not be
interpreted in light of a state’s ethos.  As we will see in the next sec-
tion, the state’s interest is accounted for under another rubric, or to be
more precise, by protecting the logic of public policy.
C. Public Security: Protecting
Public security is one of the negative externalities discussed by law
and economics scholars.  Yet, the logic of security matters merits a
separate category.  Negative externalities are normally associated
with prejudicial effects of private contracts on third parties.  The typi-
cal example is a manufacturing contract that brings about negative
environmental consequences to a specific region.  In simple economics
202. Id.
203. RICHARD SHAPCOTT, INTERNATIONAL ETHICS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2010).
204. ANDREW LINKLATER, BEYOND REALISM AND MARXISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 147 (1990).
205. PHENG CHEAH, INHUMAN CONDITIONS: ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
157 (2006).
206. See supra note 192.
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terms, the benefit society receives from the contract is outweighed by
its costs.
The logic of security matters is distinct from negative externalities.
Security concerns derive from the leviathan nature of states, capable
of trumping normal politics.207  In this sense, the existence of states
rests above all other concerns, even public interest, in the way de-
scribed above.  Security matters could create a state of exception, sus-
pending all aspects of societal lives, including normal politics and
law.208  The notion of homo sacer209 constitutes this order of public
policy.
In this paradigm of pubic policy, the interest of states is of para-
mount importance.  Among states’ interests, survival is the lone inter-
est that could create the state of exception.  In the judicial evaluation
of public policy matters involving states’ survival, balancing is of little
help.  Let’s imagine the following scenario: North Korea is willing to
spend a considerable amount of money to import certain auto parts
from the United States.  These auto parts could be equally utilized in
the inter-continental ballistic missile industry.  The chance of using
the parts in the missile industry is quite meager.  Following the bal-
ancing approach, with very little chance of using the parts in missile
industry, the contract should be enforceable.  However, the contract,
albeit lucrative, will likely be deemed void.  The slight chance of
threat to states’ survival will suspend the logic of balancing.
207. This prerogative goes to the heart of the notion of sovereignty.
For most legal purposes, the concept of sovereignty should be understood
as more performative than normative.  It denotes a roster of legal capa-
bilities, privileges, and obligations that attend the recognition of a politi-
cal entity as a state more than it authorizes a principled account of the
criteria by which polities may claim and merit statehood.
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITI-
CAL RESPONSIBILITY 27 (2001).
208. It is the result of a basic paradox of sovereignty.  Carl Schmitt famously said,
“[T]he sovereign stands outside the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to
it, since it is up to him to decide if the constitution is to be suspended in toto.”
CARL SCHIMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 13 (1922), reprinted in GIORGIO AGAMBEN,
HOMOS SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15 (Werner Hamacher & David
E. Wellbery eds., Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
209. Homo sacer is a term proposed by Giorgio Agamben.  He uses Roman law as an
example to make his case.  The sacred man is a man who has committed a crime
yet whoever kills him will not be convicted of murder.  The sacred man is outside
of the law despite being alive. AGAMBEN, supra note 208, at 71. Agamben uses
this example to show that sovereignty can suspend normal politico-juridical life.
The same logic applies to the sovereign body best described by King Charles Al-
bert of Savoy’s statute: “[T]he person of the sovereign is sacred and inviolable.”
Killing both the sacred man and the sovereign body does not result in the crime of
homicide. Id. at 102.  Agamben aims to demonstrate that the logic of sovereignty
cannot correspond entirely with the logic of juridico-political order.  Following the
Schmittian view, sovereignty is both inside and outside of the juridico-political
life. Id. at 15.
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In a real and recent case, President Obama ordered a company
named Ralls to “divest all interests” in an Oregon wind farm because
the acquisition contract was void ab initio.210  The reason was that the
merger and acquisition would have potentially posed a threat to the
national security of the United States.211  The acquiring company be-
longed to Chinese investors with alleged ties to the Chinese Govern-
ment.212  This is not an isolated case and the U.S. routinely monitors
transactions that might pose any threats to the security of the coun-
try.213  The threats can be caused, inter alia, by the possibility of for-
eign access to certain information or by control of foreign entities over
critical infrastructure.214  As strongly noted in scholarship, this pro-
210. Order Signed by the President Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind
Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation, 2012 WL 4468511 (Sept. 28,
2012).
211. “There is credible evidence that leads me to believe that Ralls Corpora-
tion . . . might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the
United States . . . .” Id.
212. Damian Paletta et al., Obama Blocks Chinese Firm from Wind-Farm Projects,
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2012, 7:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100008723
96390444712904578024590739979984, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/CCQ3-
Q9FG.  The investors did not back down.  For the first time, a company who was
denied investment due to foreign investment-related regulations brought a case
against the United States in a United States court.  The result came in favor of
the company: the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the Dis-
trict Court decision due to, inter alia, violation of the Due Process Clause.  Ralls
Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 302–03 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
213. Currently, the main entity responsible for reviewing foreign direct investment in
the US is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
In 1975, President Gerard Ford established CFIUS.  However, it remained a rela-
tively dormant committee due in part to its lack of an enforcement mechanism.
In 2007, the CFIUS gained further discretion with the enactment of the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act (FINSA).  For a brief history of CFIUS, see
Paul Connell & Tian Huang, Note, An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining
Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 131,
135–38 (2014).  FINSA provides wide discretion for the U.S. government, espe-
cially in foreign investment, in sectors such as critical infrastructure, critical
technologies, and foreign government-controlled transactions, which “could result
in the control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States
by a foreign government or any entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a for-
eign government.”  Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub.
L. 110-49, § 2(4), 121 Stat. 246.  The law was passed following two controversial
foreign investments in the US: China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s
(CNOOC) bid for Unocal in 2005 and Dubai Ports World’s (DPW) bid in 2006.
David Baroza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Company Offers $18.5 Billion
for Unocal, USA TODAY (June 22, 2005, 9:06 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday
.com/money/industries/energy/2005-06-22-cnooc-unocal_x.htm, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/3ALN-QQ6X; David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company
Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006.
214. For a list of factors considered by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States for national security analysis of foreign investments, see David N.
Fagan, The US Regulatory and Institutional Framework for FDI, in INVESTING IN
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tectionist practice of the U.S. does not correspond with economic effi-
ciency.215  As a result, some scholars have suggested balancing
national economic benefits and national security interests.216  How-
ever, the logic of public security evades balancing, as a remote possi-
bility of danger trumps potential economic benefits of the society at
large.  These transactions were deemed void because of congressional
acts and presidential orders related to foreign investment.  However,
the discussion helps us understand the logic of public security at the
enforcement stage of contracts or arbitral awards.  In this strand of
public policy the role of the parties is more restricted and the courts
should play a more active role.  Yet, the focal point is the interest of
the state and whether contracts, transactions, or arbitral awards
might endanger this interest.
Notwithstanding the state-centric logic of public policy in regards
to public security, courts should not be deferential to states’ decisions
on this matter.217  State officials tend to portray any threats to their
state’s existence as highly critical.  The electoral system contributes to
these hyperbolic gestures.  Incumbent officials would like to demon-
strate that they have saved the states from an important external
threat.  Therefore, it is the courts’ duty to investigate matters based
on the documents provided.  However, this area is beyond the discus-
sion of this Article.
Public security is a strand of the public policy doctrine that bars
private legal arrangements from yielding their ordinary results.  The
THE UNITED STATES: IS THE US READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 45, 61 (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2009).
215. Connell & Huang, supra note 213, at 147 (“We can extrapolate three main points
from the result of our event study.  First, the CFIUS actions resulted in a wealth
transfer to American companies.  Second, this wealth transfer resulted in a corre-
sponding deadweight (or efficiency) loss.  Third, in the long run, these CFIUS
actions may have a deterrent effect on foreign firms considering future
acquisitions.”).
216. See, e.g., Joanna Rubin Travalini, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
Achieving A Balance Between National Economy Benefits and National Security
Interests, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 779 (2009); Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting
National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-
Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2006); George Stephanov Georgiev, The Re-
formed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between Continued Openness
to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2008);
Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional
Involvement Is too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325 (2007); Gaurav Sud, Note, From
Fretting Takeovers to Vetting CFIUS: Finding a Balance in U.S. Policy Regarding
Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1303 (2006).
217. The discussion on courts’ deference to the Executive is a broad topic.  It often
comes up regarding the emergency powers of the U.S. government and the extent
to which courts can exercise their judicial review, given the political question doc-
trine. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BAL-
ANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007); US NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY (Russell A. Miller ed., 2008).
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logic of public security, however, is distinct from the public interest
and public morality categories.  It is state-centric and allows a limited
role for adjudicators and litigators.218  Due to its state-of-exception
nature,219 the balancing approach does not suffice to explicate it.
Strong laws and regulations in this area,220 coupled with its political
nature, have prevented a well-developed legal method from emerging
in this strand of public policy.  However, understanding the logic
would help us spot cases of public security in the wide-range of public
policy exception cases.
D. Epilogue
A summary of the three strands of public policy is shown here in
the form of a table:
Judges’ Parties’
Strand Logic Method Role Role
Public Balancing Law & Econ. Passive ActiveInterest
Public Critical/ HighlyEducating PassiveMorality Natural Law Active
Public Protecting Positivism Active PassiveSecurity
This Part aimed to argue that the doctrine of public policy does not
constitute a single monolithic concept.  As John Bell points out,
“[P]ublic policy does not denote any one rule or principle, but is, rather
an umbrella covering a variety of considerations which may have a
bearing on the issue before the court . . . .”221  Embedded in this doc-
trine, I argue, are at least three distinct notions, accumulating as a
218. John Locke’s theory of prerogative clarifies the Janus-faced nature of public se-
curity.  While public security is a legal prerogative for governments aimed to pro-
mote public good, it is designed to act according to the discretion of the
government “without prescription of law, sometimes even against it.” JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 84 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1689).
He keenly observes the exceptional nature of this prerogative: “This power,
whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and arguably to the trust and
ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned.” Id.
219. Carl Schmitt famously stated that in liberalism, law can bestow the authority of
determining the emergency and state of exception, but law cannot determine the
procedures and substance of this state of exception.  Adrian Vermeule, Our
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1100–01 (2009).
220. See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91
Stat. 1625 (1977); Defense Production Act, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 59 Stat. 1081
(1950); Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
49, 121 Stat. 246; Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
221. BELL, supra note 163, at 156.
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result of a long history of the doctrine of public policy and the develop-
ment of political and legal theories.
Public interest logic emerged out of the economic turn in the legal
culture and the emergence of the regulatory state.  This strand aims
to assess various stakes in enforcing a contract by employing the cost-
benefit balancing test.  The role of the adjudicator can be minimal be-
cause parties can argue whether the benefits gained out of enforcing
the contract outweigh its costs.  Judges, however, have a more leading
role when cases against public policy involve matters of public moral-
ity.  Leaving the economical analysis aside, adjudicators should focus
on community-based morals rather than on governmental interests.
Mandates by security increasingly play a more important role in the
realm of public policy.  Under this strand, judges have to consider
states’ interest in survival and security versus the benefits of enforc-
ing a private legal arrangement.
The existing theories and practice lump all these three strands
under the rubric of a public policy exception without paying due con-
sideration to its nature.  This has resulted in the convoluted doctrine
of public policy present today that has instigated much skepticism
among scholars and practitioners.  A look at the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts illustrates how the multi-logical nature of public policy
has been neglected.  Section 178 of the Restatement deals with con-
tractual terms that are against public policy:
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unen-
forceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly out-
weighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account
is taken of
(a) the parties’ justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were de-
nied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the partic-
ular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, ac-
count is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or
judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent
to which it was deliberate, and
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(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct
and the term.222
The Restatement’s recipe is only applicable in a limited number of
cases—where public policies and interests are clearly declared and de-
lineated.  It also rests on a few implicit assumptions, which this Arti-
cle aimed to challenge.  First and foremost, it assumes that setting
public policy is principally a legislative task.  This view is problematic
because of the importance of judicial review in the form of statutory
interpretation or reconciling different public policies.223  Secondly, the
statement portrays the concept of public policy as an ungraded notion,
providing a single recipe for all cases: balancing.
Various courts have merely called for weighing the interests of en-
forcement against the public policy interest.  Yet, as shown by studies,
courts rarely proceed to actually balance the interests, rather they
merely pay lip service to the language of the Restatement.224  I attri-
bute this to the equivocal approach of the Restatement towards the
notion of public policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public policy doctrine is an avenue through which res publica,
or public affairs, collides with private legal arrangements and bars
them from yielding ordinary results.  It might be the fifty-third card in
the deck, yet it is a trump card capable of freezing contracts, foreign
judgments, or arbitral awards.  Originally, public policy aimed to pro-
tect acts that were encounter commone ley, or communal norms.  With
the birth of modern states, the notion of public policy has shifted to
protect harms against the very essence of states among other things.
This resulted in a complicated theory of public policy, stirring contro-
versy in the judicial system concerning its own role.  In addition, fol-
lowing the establishment of the regulatory state and new legal
theories, public policy also turned from a judicially crafted theory to a
legislatively imposed notion, dictating an increasingly passive role on
the judicial body.
This Article opens the black box of public policy.  It argues that the
doctrine of public policy consists of three distinct strands, each with a
separate logic requiring a separate method for its analysis.  The Arti-
cle identified these three strands—public interest, public morality,
and public security.  Each has a distinct constitutive grammar of its
own.  Public interest is structured around economic calculation re-
lated to costs and benefits of enforcing certain arbitral awards or con-
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
223. See section IV.B.
224. Friedman, supra note 23, at 572 (“I found in my examination of the cases that
courts rarely put the Willistonian ‘weighing/balancing’ approach into practice.”).
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tracts.  Public morality aims to protect communal values that might
be endangered by enforcement through the apparatus of the judicial
branch.  Lastly, public security speaks to the exceptionalist logic of
statehood and protecting states’ survival interest.
Justice Burrough called the doctrine of public policy an “unruly
horse” in 1824.  After almost 200 years, the specter of this statement
hovers around arguments related to public policy at the enforcement
stage of private legal acts or arbitral proceedings.  I can assure you
that, even as you read these words, there are lawyers in domestic or
international cases that are fervently arguing to set aside a private
legal arrangement based on public policy grounds or, conversely, try-
ing to defend enforcement against a public policy defense.  Simply,
and following common sense, a definition put forward two centuries
ago and the paradigm that has ensued do not suffice to illuminate the
matter in the complex domestic and international matters of today’s
world.  Scholarly ventures in the area of public policy in law have al-
ways been intimidating, as it involves a protean concept with a long
legal tradition.  Yet, we should echo what Percy Winfield said almost a
century ago: “But none, at any rate at the present day, has looked
upon [public policy] as a Pegasus that might soar beyond the momen-
tary needs of the community.”225  This Article shows how this Pegasus
can soar beyond the needs of the community.
225. Winfield, supra note 26, at 91.
